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Foxy Ladies and Men with Guns:  
Desires and Fantasies in Two Modernist Fox Stories 
Tamás Tukacs 
1 Introduction  
The use of animals in fables has a long tradition in European (and in world) 
literature. Most of these allegorical stories can, in general, be easily decoded, for 
most of them are elaborated presentations of some truth or morale deemed to be 
universally valid. One of the most common animal characters that features in 
these allegories is the fox. The fox can be found in Aesop’s fables, served as the 
basis of the medieval Reynard cycle, and through this cycle found its way into 
Chaucer’s “The Nun Priest’s Tale,” later appearing in La Fontaine’s tales, and so 
on. Over the centuries, “the stylized concept of the fox as a subversive, 
disruptive, intelligent marauder” (Asker, Aspects 38) has established itself in 
literature. Foxes, however, not only served as immutable characters in plots that 
follow roughly the same pattern. According to D. B. D. Asker, the “fox fairy” 
appears as a financial and spiritual helper in Japanese and Chinese tales, evoking 
connotations that transcend the traditions of the above-mentioned, intelligent, 
shrewd marauder-type of fox. Bearing essentially feminine traits, it opens up 
rather exciting (and disturbing) possibilities of interpretation in the fox-man 
relationship, with “an association of the fox with the fulfilment of the carnal 
desires of men” (Aspects 31). The vixen figure often appears as a truly 
carnivalesque figure, eschewing traditional morality, subverting established 
(male-dominated) systems, and with its trickster-like qualities, calling into 
question firm hierarchies, and mobilising various fantasies and desires (see the 
peculiar connotations of “the foxy lady” in contemporary popular culture).  
In an especially revealing passage of his autobiography, Henry Green, one 
of the most idiosyncratic English writers of the twentieth century, compares the 
task of remembering to a foxhunt: “As we listen to what we remember, to the 
echoes, there is no question but the notes are muted, […] now no louder than the 
cry of the huntsman on the hill a mile or more away when he views the fox. We 
who must die soon, or so it seems to me, should chase our memories back, 
standing, when they are found, enough apart not to be too near what they once 
meant. Like the huntsman, on a hill and when he blows his horn, like him some 
way away from us” (97). Later in that chapter, however, after recounting a 
peculiarly embarrassing childhood event, it is the fox that he identifies with, 
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instead of the rememberer (the hunter): “Later, when the accident I have 
described disrupted me, I felt, and it is hard to explain, as though the feelings I 
thought I ought to have were hunting me. I was as much alone as any hunted 
fox,” and this feeling persisted “until the fox I was was caught” (102). Green 
here reveals an intriguing dynamic between the hunter and the prey, opening up 
a field rich in the connotations of “hunting” and “haunting.” In the man-animal, 
fox-hunter relationship, both can take the position of the victim and the killer 
alike, which is especially true in the gender-determined relationship of the male 
hunter and the vixen. A curious transference is often to be seen in this relationship 
that goes back at least to the time of Ovid and his story about Acteon and Diana: 
when the former is transformed by the gods into a stag and is violently killed, “a 
powerful residual element of sympathetic magic” is mobilised (Asker, “Vixens” 
182), and through a process of animal metamorphosis, the hunter and the hunted 
change positions.  
In what follows, I shall look at this “interpersonal” dynamics between the 
hunter and the hunted by examining two Modernist texts, “Lady into Fox” by 
David Garnett (1922) and “The Fox” by D. H. Lawrence (1923). Both stories 
emphasise the subversive quality of the animal figure, revealing the dynamism 
of this dyadic relationship. I am going to analyse “Lady into Fox” along the lines 
of a dream text and the structure of a double fantasy, and in the second part of 
the essay, I shall look at “The Fox” from the point of view of the Hegelian 
master-slave relationship.  
2 A Case-Study of a Childless Marriage: David Garnett’s “Lady into Fox” 
2.1 The nature of the text 
The first thing that astounds any reader of David Garnett’s “Lady into Fox” is 
the way the author begins to shake his or her confidence in the authority of the 
text by blurring the boundaries of “real” and “supernatural.” The tone Garnett 
employs in the first few pages of the story is not unlike any serious writing, or, 
let us say, a psychoanalytical case-history. He talks in a scientific tone, cites 
facts and asserts that “the sudden changing of Mrs. Tebrick into a vixen is an 
established fact” (7), a “true story fully proved” (8). A few pages later he goes 
on outlining the background of the events, relating Mrs. Tebrick’s family name 
(which was—not accidentally—Fox), how she was married to Tebrick in 1879, 
how she spent her childhood and so on. At the level of form and diction 
everything seems to be acceptable for the reader to give credit to the narration. 
What is problematic, of course, is what the text is about, the transformation of a 
human being into an animal. However carefully the narrator wants to preserve 
his authority to tell us the case history, he seemingly contradicts himself. First he 
suggests that it is pure facts that he is going to write about, later he emphasises 
the profane nature of the miracle that may happen in a material world, 
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unsupported by the interpretive force of any authoritative text: “it is indeed a 
miracle; something from outside our world altogether; an event which we would 
willingly accept if we were to meet it invested with the authority of Divine 
Revelation in the scriptures” (9, emphasis in the original).  
There is one option, however, with the help of which one may look at such 
a text in which the contradiction of impossibility and reality need not be resolved: 
approaching the story as a dream text (by definition a wish-fulfilling text). As 
Freud points out, miracle or fantasy taking the place of reality can only happen in 
dreams, where contraries and contradictions are simply not represented (Dreams 
429). The narrator makes several references to dreams and dreaming in the main 
body of the text as well. After Silvia changes into a fox, her husband—quite 
naturally, we could add—exclaims, “Can it be she? Am I not dreaming?” (14). 
Later, he “had […] gone about paying off his servants and shooting his dogs as 
if he were in a dream” (22). When there is a hope that both Tebrick and Silvia 
are going to be able to “wake” from this dream-like state, he says, “Surely this 
affliction will pass soon as suddenly as it came, and it will all seem to us as an 
evil dream” (40). It is around this point that this dream-text about the fox begins 
to show its dangerous facet for both wife and husband. After Tebrick can do 
nothing but release Silvia into the woods, he starts to display more and more 
serious symptoms: “Indeed I am crazy now! My affliction has made me lose 
what little reason I ever had! […] I am thin and wasted by this consuming 
passion, my reason is gone and I feed myself on dreams” (95). Just like in the 
introductory pages, fantasy and dream totally replace what we could call 
“reality” or “normality.” On the basis of these quotations we can conclude that 
the text of the novel can be regarded as a chronologically ordered, “polished” 
version of an extremely disturbing and neurotic dream-text. The question whose 
dream it is will soon be discussed.  
Another important characteristic feature of the text is its regressive quality. 
According to the “classical” Freudian theory, dreams (and other psychological 
phenomena that display the surfacing of unconscious material) often display 
signs of regression, going back to infantile states of being. This regression 
appears in two ways in Garnett’s story. On the one hand, as I shall demonstrate, 
the story of the transformation can be conceived of as an infantile regressive 
fantasy; on the other hand, the text’s mode of representation is likewise 
regressive.  
On a superficial level, “Lady into Fox” is an easily decodable allegorical 
story, in which the figure of the fox embodies an ancient Rousseauian notion of 
“back to nature,” or, in an alternative approach, just like in Lawrence’s “The 
Fox,” the fox becomes the symbol of some primeval energy, an invigorating 
force that brings life, mysticism, freedom, and some sort of higher level of 
existence into the stale and limiting English post-war environment (see Asker, 
Aspects 38). The fox can be seen as the allegory of a natural, uncorrupted force 
that cannot live within the boundaries of modern civilisation, and is bound to be 
destroyed. What seems to be more important here is that the text exposes a 
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decided “indifference to reality as we ordinary perceive it” (Skura 140). Being 
an allegorical narrative, this story, just like regressive modes of consciousness, 
“ignore[s] the conventions of realism the way a child does” (Skura 140). The 
allegorical and regressive mode of representation is another factor that justifies 
one in evaluating the text as a dream, since dreams always look for the best, 
concretised and pictorial way of representation, being unable to signify abstract 
notions (Freud, Dreams 455). Here the figure of the fox (and that of the dogs, 
too) serves as a tangible, representable object. There is an important difference, 
however. While, in psychoanalytic terms, regression ignores or escapes from the 
“reality principle” for the sake of uncontrolled pleasure, allegories usually work 
the other way round: it is often the pleasant (subversive, disruptive, disturbing) 
story that is supposed to be replaced and concealed by the authority-giving, 
moral-driven, “serious” allegorical version. Thus, Garnett’s story, conceived of 
as a dream text, reveals the potentially disturbing and desire-driven content of a 
conventional allegorical story or fable.  
2.2 Silvia’s fantasy  
Regression into childhood is not only perceivable on the level of the narrative 
form, but on the level of the plot as well. To illustrate this, first we must take a 
look at Silvia’s “case-history” to be able to show the motivating force that sets 
this regressive process in motion. 
In the first few pages of the text the reader is informed that Silvia Fox was 
married, “after a short courtship” (10) to Richard Tebrick. The narrator 
ascertains that they were indeed a very happy couple. A look into the prehistory 
of this marriage may, however, also prove to be fruitful. Though the narrator 
does not attribute much importance to the fact that Silvia “having once hunted 
when she was a child of ten and having been blooded […] took great fright and 
disgust at it, and vomited after it was done” (10), one feels that this childhood 
event must be of great importance. We are also informed that “she had been 
strictly brought up by a woman of excellent principles and considerable 
attainments, who died a year or so before the marriage. And owing to the 
circumstance that her mother had been dead many years, her father bedridden, 
and not altogether rational for a little while before his death, they had a few 
visitors but her uncle” (12). It is impossible not to remember the case of Dora, 
Freud’s patient, who also began to show signs of hysteria during the illness of 
her father, her hysteric coughing being the result of a transference and 
subsequent identification following the kiss given by “Herr K.,” and who started 
to develop a father-complex. It is no wonder that after these preliminaries (the 
trauma of being covered by fox blood), Silvia “was reserved almost to shyness” 
(11). It is one year after the wedding that Silvia’s fox-fantasy is set in motion. It 
is while fox hunting that memories of childhood begin to surface in a traumatic 
manner, the second event recalling and reinterpreting the first one in a traumatic 
way. Tebrick wants to force Silvia to go with him after the fox: she “hung back, 
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and he, holding her hand, began almost to drag her […] she suddenly snatched 
her hand away from his very violently [unusual of a shy wife!] and cried out” 
(13). This is naturally related to the childhood memory mentioned above, 
displaying the link between Silvia’s nervousness and the infantile event, since in 
a dream, causal relations can be expressed with a scene of transformation: “The 
other method of representing a causal relation is adapted to less extensive 
material and consists in one image in the dream, whether a person or a thing, 
being transformed into another” (Freud, Dreams 427). In this climactic moment 
the infantile memory is mobilised and bursts out. But why is Silvia transformed 
into a fox, and why a fox? 
When Silvia is transformed, she unconsciously identifies with the fox in her 
fantasy. This identification is, on a certain level, the result of her attachment to 
the two most powerful male figures in her life, her father and her husband. Her 
father, because he, like the fox, inevitably dies, and her husband, because of her 
intimate relationship with him. According to the Freudian theory, “identification 
is most frequently used in hysteria to express a common sexual element. A 
hysterical woman identifies herself in her symptoms most readily—though not 
exclusively—with people with whom she has had sexual relations or with people 
who have had sexual relations with the same people as herself. [...] In hysterical 
phantasies, just as in dreams, it is enough for purposes of identification that the 
subject should have thoughts of sexual relation without their having necessarily 
taken place in reality” (Dreams 233). It shall be remembered that, since wild 
animals often, as a result of a transference, stand for persons feared by the 
hysteric, the fox is an available figure for her to denote both her father and 
husband: “a dreaded father is [often] represented by a beast of prey or a dog or 
wild horse—a form of representation recalling totemism” (Freud, Dreams 536). 
Thus, according to this approach, Silvia’s transformation into a fox is the result 
of her Oedipal identification of the two threatening male authorities in her life.  
On the other hand, a fox can mean herself in a neurotic fantasy in relation to 
her husband. Thus she comes to mean a (potential) victim in the eyes of her 
husband who has a gun and has power over such a creature: during the story he 
could kill her at any moment. Thus, fox becomes a double symbol, at once 
motivated by Oedipal fantasies and identification with the father/husband, and 
produced by an identification with a victim position. Naturally, the whole 
process is instigated by her own name, Silvia Fox. In her neurotic fantasies, just 
like in dreams and with children, a proper name comes to mean an object (Freud, 
Dreams 412).  
There are other factors that make it especially apt for Sylvia to identify with 
a fox. With the help of identification she can reach back to her infantile 
fantasies. After she changes into a fox, her husband “took her in his arms. She 
lay very close to him, nestling under his coat and fell to licking his face” (14). 
This is not at all unlike a scene when a child is taken up to his mother’s breast, 
as it is pointed out in the story: “for when we are overcome with the greatest 
sorrow we act not like men or women but like children whose comfort in all 
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their troubles is to press themselves against their mother’s breast” (15–16). Of 
course we need not neglect the Oedipal fantasies (Tebrick as a symbolic father) 
and the “normal” sexual aspects (Silvia licking her husband’s face) in this scene, 
either. Similar infantile fantasies are mobilised when Tebrick makes a remark to 
his wife: “Silvia, what a light-hearted childish creature you are” (36). It is not 
surprising that apart from Tebrick, only her old nurse, Mrs Cork recognises her. 
After she comes back for a while she treats her like a child: “the old woman 
talked to her as though she were a baby and treated her as such” (61). Later 
Tebrick decides to move from Stokoe to Nanny’s house, which is near Tangley 
Hall, where she “would feel at home,” “having known it from her childhood” 
(65). Apart from these instances of identification, an animal is an excellent 
figure to represent a child: it is playful, it cannot eat properly, walks on all fours, 
cannot dress itself, cannot talk, does not observe the traditional rules of 
“civilised” behaviour. She gradually regresses into this childhood state: first she 
is able to recognise the cards they play with, later they are nothing more than 
sheets of paper.  
Apart from regression and identification, another very important fantasy of 
Silvia is becoming independent of her husband, and leading a life of her own in 
the woods. One can thus observe a double movement: one backwards, into 
childhood, and one forward, leading to an independent life, and finding one’s 
true self, fulfilling one’s fantasies. We have to bear in mind that Silvia and 
Tebrick at this point have no children, so her desire for offspring is quite natural. 
This is all the more probable since generally in dreams “small animals and 
vermin [here the cubs] represent small children (Dreams 474). Mrs. Cork’s 
statement, however, is revealing in this respect: “But whatever she looks like, 
you should trust her the same as ever. If you do, she’ll do her best to be a good 
wife to you, if you don’t I shouldn’t wonder if she did turn into a proper fox” 
(58, my emphasis). That is, as long as Tebrick forces an emotional bond on 
Silvia, and is able exert power over her, she cannot be free and be rid of her 
neurotic fantasies, and lead a “normal” life again (that is, have a happy family 
and children). As long as she is bound to Tebrick, who expects his “fox to be as 
candid and honest with him in all things as the country girl he has married” (79), 
her wish cannot be fulfilled. It is only in the idyllic sphere of her fox-family that 
Silvia can experience the happiness she lacks in her real life. Of course the 
reality principle, symbolised by the hounds, does not let this fantasy be long-
lived. In the final dramatic scene when the dogs tear her apart, she again tries to 
find a shelter in the arms of Tebrick, that is, regress again into an infantile 
fantasy. This solution has proved to be insufficient once, so the subject of 
fantasy has to perish. 
2.3 Tebrick’s fantasy 
The peculiarity of the text is that it can be interpreted both as Silvia’s and 
Tebrick’s fantasy at the same time. As it has already been pointed out, the fox, 
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being a manifold, overdetermined symbol can mean at the same time Silvia’s 
father as a sort of fearful totem, Tebrick, a similarly violent fantasy object, but 
also a vulnerable creature (a child or a weak woman) exposed to the violence of 
hunters, hounds and Tebrick.  
In Tebrick’s fantasy text, his wife is transformed into a fox that can be kept 
in captivity and be possessed exclusively. The sadistic desire fantasy of Tebrick, 
a hunter, naturally fancies an animal whose life depends entirely on him. First, 
the cruel aspect of the fantasy does not surface, for he keeps kissing and 
caressing his wife as if it/she was still a human being. The key problem with the 
transformation of his wife is that it has to be kept a secret from other people: 
“Having got her into the house the next thing he thought of was to hide her from 
the servants” (16). Tebrick starts to build a fantasy world, but, as Freud remarks, 
“he [the creative writer, the one who fantasises in general] is expected not to go 
on playing or phantasying any longer but act in the real world; on the other hand, 
some of the wishes which give rise to his phantasies are of a kind which it is 
essential to conceal” (“Creative” 134, emphasis mine). Indeed, Tebrick does not 
act the way that could be expected of an adult: instead of killing a fox, he looks 
after it, but this fantasy of his has to be concealed. At the beginning he tries to 
shut out the reality principle from the fantasy world: he sends the servants off, 
and shoots the dogs (that may kill his fantasy).  
His wife as a fox represents at least two kinds of fantasy for Tebrick. On the 
one hand, as has been pointed out above, Silvia as a fox is an especially good 
way of representing a child-like state. Thus, the more “civilised” or polished 
fantasy of Tebrick would be an ambitious one: to have a child, who can be 
played with, who has to be taken care of, with whom he can go for a walk, who 
is funny and mischievous. On the other hand, his wife as a fox represents 
another, not so elegant undercurrent in his fantasy, a sadistic daydream. Being a 
wild animal, she is very difficult to keep under control, and so has to be 
punished again and again. After he presents a rabbit to her,  
when he went in what a horrid shambles was spread before his eyes. 
Blood on the carpet, blood on the armchairs and antimacassars, even a 
little blood spurted onto the wall, and what was worse, Mrs Tebrick 
tearing and growling over a little piece of skin and legs, for she had 
eaten up all the rest of it. The poor gentleman was so heartbroken over 
this that he was likely to have done himself an injury, and at one 
moment thought of getting his gun, to have shot himself and the vixen, 
too. (emphasis mine, 47)  
After a few minutes, “though he beat her off four of five times even giving her 
blows and kicks, she still came back to him, crawling on her belly, and 
imploring his forgiveness with wide and sorrowful eyes” (47). No wonder that 
he—apparently out of pure compassion—“almost wish[es] her to be a mere fox 
than to suffer so much by being a half-human” (50). By transforming his wife 
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into a fox, he could maintain this ideal master-slave relationship and do 
whatever he wanted to her, without feeling guilt or remorse. If one recalls 
Silvia’s nickname, given her by Tebrick, Puss (in expletive slang, in the form of 
“pussy” also means the female sexual organ) or his gun, which can equally serve 
as a phallic symbol, this daydream, doubtlessly, has strong sexual connotations. 
This sadistic fantasy has to be kept carefully in secret, first in the house, later, in 
the garden of Nanny’s house surrounded by walls (cf. Tebrick’s name!). As the 
narrator reports, “The next morning he looked about him at the place and found 
the thing that he most wanted, and that was a little walled-in garden where his 
wife could run in freedom and yet be in safety” (69). For a while Tebrick’s 
fantasy provides him with a secure field, the only important thing is that the fox 
must not transgress this symbolic wall.  
The situation becomes really dangerous when he sees that it is almost 
impossible to keep her back. Sadistic fantasies that seemed to have been 
successfully repressed now threaten to become charged with forces from the 
unconscious and transformed into motility. He resolves to release Silvia into the 
woods, that is, he seems to give up his fantasy. Of course he cannot simply give 
up his fantasy; what Tebrick wants to do is seemingly repress his fantasy by 
providing it another secure place. It is just after this repression of the sadistic 
fantasies that signs of hysteria and neurosis start to appear in him: “he went out 
of the room and up to bed, and lay down as he was, in his clothes, utterly 
exhausted, and fell into a dog’s sleep” (85). He also starts to insult a hunter, 
prohibiting him to hunt around the premises, who understands nothing whatever 
of the situation. Tebrick begins to display more and more serious signs of 
neurosis. In search of his wife, he “dared not to go himself, lest his passion 
should master him and he might commit a murder” (89). He does not care about 
himself anymore, “gave up washing himself for a week or two at a stretch,” eats 
next to nothing, turns away from civilization, and lives a secluded life (which is 
also a form of regression). It is worth quoting a longer passage that illustrates 
well his state of mind: 
All this disorder fed a malignant pleasure in him. For by now he had 
come to hate his fellow-men and was embittered against all human 
decencies and decorum. For strange to tell he never in these months 
regretted his dear wife whom he had so much loved. No, all that he 
grieved for now was his departed vixen. He was haunted all this time 
not by the memory of a sweet and gentle woman, but by the 
recollection of an animal […]. His one hope was the recovery of this 
beast, and of this he dreamed continually. Likewise both walking and 
sleeping he was visited by visions of her; her mask, her full white-
tagged brush, white throat, and thick fur in her ears all haunted him. 
(91, emphasis mine)  
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When the repressed desire fantasy begins to be really dangerous, Tebrick tries to 
neutralize it with sublimation—he wishes to lead a religious life. His efforts 
prove fruitless since Silvia’s uncle, Rev. Fox, seeing that his mental state is 
somewhat precarious, does not encourage him to join the church.  
Following this, Tebrick attempts to cope with his neurosis by visiting his 
wife’s fox-family in the woods. This stage corresponds to Silvia’s infantile 
regressive fantasy. The civilized, ambitious layer of this fantasy is the same as 
that of his wife: to have a happy family with several children. Gradually, 
however, Tebrick discards all attempts at seriousness and regresses into a child-
like state. “He understood, or so he fancied, what it was to be happy, and that he 
found complete happiness now, living from day to day, careless of the future 
[…]” (emphasis mine, 109–110). When in an idyllic scene he carelessly plays 
with the cubs “all human customs and institutions seemed to him nothing but 
folly” (121). Finally “he had got a way of going doubled up, often almost on all 
fours […]” (125). However, this way of coping with his neurosis is not 
successful, either: the sadistic fantasy cannot be repressed with regression and 
done away with. Chased by hounds, Silvia, the fox, “ran straight to the open gate 
to him” (129). The censorship of the ego that blocked his repressed fantasy falls 
away, and the energy-charged sadistic primal scene now returns, but, having to 
meet the reality-principle symbolized by the hounds, it is bound to perish.  
2.4 The Psychopathology of Marriage?  
David Garnett’s “Lady into Fox” shows several ways of coping with desire and 
the lack of wish-fulfillment: in the case of Silvia, two solutions are available. 
The first is a regressive infantile fantasy, with the help of which she identifies 
with a fox and wishes to be taken care of and treated like a child. (This is 
presumably a late wish-fulfillment, since she, owing to her family conditions, 
lacked the happiness a child can expect.) The other solution for her is to turn this 
infantile fantasy into an ambitious one: she desires to have children and a happy 
family, but without the help of her husband, and to lead a “natural” or “normal” 
life. We cannot ignore two other possible interpretations, one of them presenting 
her husband as a fearful hunter, a sort of Oedipal totemic figure with a gun, the 
other being an identification with the dead father in the form of a dead fox. 
In the case of Tebrick, the lack of wish fulfillment surfaces in four ways: 
the first, and most prominent one is a sadistic daydream, by which he conceives 
of his wife as an object of violence, a victim, over whose life he has complete 
power. No wonder he gradually wishes his wife’s entire transformation into an 
animal that can be done violence to without any censorship of the ego. He has to 
conceal this fantasy from other people, of which the symbol is a garden 
surrounded by walls. Secondly, when the sadistic fantasy begins to threaten his 
integrity, he tries repression, which corresponds with his releasing his fox into 
the woods. For a short time he does not have access to her, and this is the short 
period when he makes an attempt at sublimation (that is, wants to be a priest). 
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After this, he starts to regress—under the cover of an ambitious dream similar to 
that of his wife—by regularly visiting his “family” in the woods, slipping back 
gradually into a childlike state. However, Silvia—the repressed sadistic fantasy—
returns to him and begins to haunt him. In the end, he cannot cope with this return, 
and Tebrick has to give the fantasy up by symbolically killing his wife.  
“The plot implied, rather clumsily in my view, that there is some essential 
quality of foxness in Mrs. Tebrick […]. Her metamorphosis is meant to suggest 
a rebuff of the married state itself,” Asker suggests (Aspects 40), unfolding the 
idea that Silvia was simply unprepared for marriage. For all the ambiguities of 
the “fox” symbol, we should not forget that, throughout the story, Silvia remains 
Tebrick’s wife. That is, all biological and emotional bonds are overturned, and a 
“weak” legal bond represented by marriage is the only thing that survives into 
the fox-stage. If one follows the logic outlined above, that is, that Garnett’s text 
unfurls a double fantasy, laden with all sorts of sadistic, masochistic and 
regressive motivations, and if one attempts to forget about the fantasy layer of 
the story, we might be able to catch a glimpse of what could be called—
following the Freudian term—the psychopathology of married life. Let us 
imagine for a moment that Silvia does not turn into a fox: the result would be the 
narrative of a neurotic, shy wife, married too early and too soon to a man who 
drinks and does violence to her, and who eventually becomes a misanthrope. In 
this scenario, Silvia would feel uncomfortable in the confines of her home, 
would go to perhaps London (as rumour has it in the village) and find another 
man and her happiness, but Tebrick, ruined and enraged, would find them and 
kill Silvia. This could be the realistic story covered by both the allegorical and 
the dream text layer of Garnett’s version.  
3 Master(s) and Slave(s): D. H. Lawrence’s “The Fox” 
In a letter to John Middleton Murry in September 1923, D. H. Lawrence called 
Garnett’s fox story “pretty piffle—just playboy stuff” (Warren et al., ed. 500). 
To Lawrence’s mind, his version of the fox story (a story in which the central 
symbol is also a fox) is allegedly more mature, more serious, “deeper” and 
reveals layers of interpersonal connections that are painfully missing from 
Garnett’s “playboy stuff.” A careful reading of the two novellas, however, 
reveals that they centre on roughly the same ideas: female independence, male 
authority, mutual domination and the fox as a subversive element in these 
relationships. In what follows, I shall look into the changes in the structure of 
domination that unfolds in this claustrophobically close community between the 
three principal characters, March, Banford and the intruder, Henry. What is the 
initial situation modified by the appearance of the fox? What kinds of 
modification take place in this structure? How is this attraction connected to 
gender roles and, more specifically, to sadomasochistic relationships? How can 
the title be interpreted, that is, what or who is the fox in Lawrence’s scheme? 
What is the role of identifications? Though I am aware of the fact that often it is 
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not the best method, in this case, however, a chronological presentation of the 
storyline seems an appropriate way in analysing the process of the modification 
of power relations. 
3.1 March’s “primal scene” 
March’s first encounter with the (real) fox can be evaluated as a “primal scene,” 
which simulates an “ideal” or classic master-slave relationship as defined by 
Hegel and is based on a dialectic process in which the master is equally in the 
power of the slave he is attempting to subjugate. As Jessica Benjamin puts it, “If 
I completely control the other, the other ceases to exist, and if the other 
completely controls me, then I cease to exist” (53). This initial structure is 
disturbed by the appearance of Henry, which distorts March’s original contact 
with the fox, and repeats it in a considerably different manner. This relationship 
can be said to be a “real” master and slave relationship, which inevitably tends 
towards death and which risks death (Benjamin 63), the participants 
unconsciously being aware of this fact. By the end of the story, Henry manages 
to transform March from a “male” master-figure into a “masochist” mother 
figure. In relation to all this, it is going to be pointed out that in spite of the fact 
that the title promises the story of one specific fox, practically all three 
characters become foxes in the novella, so that by the end we cannot talk about 
the fox, but about the position of a fox that the characters subsequently occupy. 
At the beginning of the story, a stable structure is suggested in the 
presentation of the two women, March and Banford, characterised by a clear 
distribution of gender roles, regardless of the two women’s biological sex. 
Exactly what kind of relationship exists between the two women, and how they 
became acquainted with each other, are hard to determine; the 1968 film version 
makes lesbianism explicit (Preston 41, see also Wachman 176). March is 
introduced as a “male” participant in the relationship: “March was the more 
robust […]. She would be the man about the place” (3). Banford, on the other 
hand, is a “small, delicate thing with spectacles” (3). Later it is made clear that 
March does about four-fifths of the work around the house like a husband, while 
Banford is relegated to the position of a “wife” doing household chores. What 
asserts March’s masculinity is that it is she who possesses the gun with which 
they try to ward off the fox that has been raiding their poultry. On the surface it 
may seem that there is a balance or harmony between the two characters, and 
that they are quite content with this distribution of the gender roles. This 
seeming harmony can, however, be questioned on the basis of little signs: their 
endless quarrels and the constant references to March’s pursed lips may be seen 
as signs of repression. The fox, which is brought into the story as an intruder 
from the woods that steals hens, is an intruder in the relationship of March and 
Banford. In this respect March’s first face-to-face encounter with the animal is 
of crucial importance. This meeting reasserts March’s position as master, but at 
the same time challenges this position. Let us see what happens: 
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She lowered her eyes, and suddenly saw the fox. He was looking up at 
her. Her chin was pressed down, and his eyes were looking up. They 
met her eyes. And he knew her. She was spellbound—she knew he 
knew her. So he looked into her eyes, and her soul failed her. He knew 
her, he was not daunted. (9)  
What is taking place here is the creation of a subtle balance of mutual 
domination. The fox is in an inferior position, looking up at March, like a slave, 
while it is he that possesses her through the power of looking. Two aspects are 
significant here: one is the eye contact, which is exceptionally clear and makes 
the participants equal partners (in the sense that both of them are masters and 
slaves at the same time). The other is the metaphorics of copulation with the 
repeated assertion of “knowing” the female, with its archaic undertones, 
referring to an intimate sexual relationship. These two aspects are, in fact, the 
two different versions of one problem, and that is the problem of boundaries. As 
Benjamin remarks, “It should be noted […] that the break must never really 
dissolve the boundaries—else death results. Excitement resides in the risk of 
death, not in death itself”(63). In this “original” scene, the trope of intrusion is of 
utmost importance, and it is as if the two participants were aware of the subtle 
mechanisms of master and slave relationship, that is, they respect each others’ 
frontiers, intrude into the other’s sphere, but make sure that these boundaries are 
not dissolved. This encounter with the fox does not only reassert March as a 
master (making her a slave at the same time), but as a woman as well, which she 
is denied in her relationship with Banford. According to Peter Preston, the 
significance of the fox’s appearance is that it painfully forces March into 
recognising her own sexuality (42) and helps to heal the scar that is the result of 
her divided personality (39); I would say, however, that this encounter widens 
the gap further between March’s role at home as a “male” master and as a 
“female” “subject,” thus reasserting her divided personality. 
3.2 From male master to masochist mother 
The appearance of Henry is an obvious repetition of the previous situation. The 
differences between the two situations, however, are more intriguing. Henry also 
makes March painfully aware of the (real, biological) difference between man 
and woman, and the stress must fall on the word “painfully.” Her relationship 
with Henry is substantially different from her encounter with the fox. It is first 
and foremost characterised by reversals as compared to the previous scene. 
March (and several critics) often uncritically identify Henry with the fox she 
saw; to quote Asker, for instance: “the trope of the fox is unmistakable in that it 
represents (metaphorically) a male presence and threat that is used to expunge 
the all-female relationship of March and Banford” (Aspects 37). However, 
March does not seem to realise that, instead of Henry, it is herself who slowly 
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becomes “the fox” in this relationship. One evening, when they are all sitting 
inside the house, she is exposed to Henry’s penetrating male gaze:  
She was very sensitive in her knees. Having no skirts to cover them, 
and being forced to sit with them boldly exposed, she suffered. She 
shrank and shrank trying not to be seen. And the youth […] glanced up 
at her with long, steady, penetrating looks, till she was almost ready to 
disappear […]. Her desire to be invisible was so strong that it quite 
baffled the youth. He felt he could not see her distinctly. She seemed 
like a shadow within a shadow. (18) 
This scene is, on the one hand, a repetition of the “original” fox scene. The most 
important difference, however, is that, as opposed to the clear vision that 
characterised the encounter of March and the fox, here that vision is blurred or 
distorted (it is significant, by the way, that all the scenes charged with tension 
take place in the dusk or in darkness). Henry is ready to push March to the 
margins, like the fox was “pushed back” into the woods by the look of March. 
Here, March becomes the fox and Henry the person with a gun, with the 
important difference that he would be ready to extinguish her: “she shrank and 
shrank […] till she was almost ready to disappear.” Henry does not maintain the 
boundary between March and himself; he wants to know her, but, at the same 
time, he risks killing her, and thus risks losing his status as master, because there 
would then be no one to give him recognition as a master if he extinguishes 
March. We now have three foxes altogether: the real animal, and March and 
Henry as foxes, with different roles. “The fox” now becomes a position (of the 
master and the slave at the same time) that is taken by various characters.  
Indeed, a look into March’s first dream of the two might serve to illustrate 
this point. In this dream she has a “painful” experience, as she dreams with a 
(the?) fox.  
She dreamed she heard a singing outside, which she could not 
understand […]. She went out, and suddenly she knew it was the fox 
singing […], he ran away and ceased singing. He seemed near, she 
wanted to touch him. She stretched out her hand and he bit her wrist and 
at the same instant, as she drew back, the fox, turning round to bound 
away, whisked his brush across her face, and it seemed his brush was on 
fire for it seared and burned her mouth with great pain. (23–24)  
In fact there are two fox-figures in her dream: the one which is singing around 
the house (the “real” fox) and the other that bites March (Henry). This dream 
scene is often interpreted as March’s longing for submission, since she identifies 
Henry with the fox. However, a choice (?) is symbolised in her dream between the 
harmonic, equal and dialectic relationship with the real fox, which is pleasant (she 
is “spellbound”) and the violent, transgressive and risky relationship with Henry.  
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This difference becomes more emphatic when Henry proposes to March. 
Before that scene, eye contact is again emphasised: “Particularly he wanted 
March. She was a strange character to him […]. Her dark eyes made something 
rise in his soul, […] an excitement he was afraid to let be seen […]. He felt he 
must go further, he was inevitably impelled” (28). His is precisely the pleasure 
of the sadist who feels impelled by the slave’s submission and interprets it as 
love. He seeks to prolong his pleasure and find new levels of resistance 
(Benjamin 58). Ideally, this prolongation serves to avoid the extinction of the 
object; however, it seems that that is precisely what Henry is especially bad at. 
Significantly, it is in darkness that he proposes marriage to her, which is another 
instance of the “blurred,” “distorted” vision mentioned above. What is more, it is 
with a dead rabbit in his hands that he first thinks of marrying March (29), which 
is ironic considering the controversies involved in their relationship and is 
indicative of the risks Henry is running concerning the two of them. The whole 
proposal appears in the context of the sadistic framework of March’s dream: 
Henry’s voice is like the “the subtle touch” (32) of the fox in the dream, and 
after her refusal, he thinks that “he had missed” (32), as if March was a target to 
be shot at. One of March’s objections is that she is old enough to be Henry’s 
mother (32). Although it is not true, since Henry is around twenty, and the two 
women are around thirty (4), yet this aspect might enrich the discussion of the 
relationship between the two people. If, symbolically, March can be conceived 
as Henry’s mother, this places their contact in the framework of Oedipality. In 
this case Henry’s sadism would be fuelled by a boy’s need of differentiation 
from and disidentification with the mother and a subsequent repudiation of the 
maternal body (Benjamin 76). This objectifying tendency seems to be reinforced 
by the next scene, in which Henry tries to force her to say yes and kiss her, 
which evokes her first dream. She can hardly articulate “Oh, I can’t” (33), “she 
wailed helplessly […] as if semi-conscious, and as if in pain, like one who dies,” 
which underlines the dangers in Henry’s marrying March.  
The following scene, when March is crocheting, can be read as a summary 
of the different power-relations and the positions of the fox that are occupied. It 
seems that while she is engaged in crocheting, she is dreaming about the fox: 
March […] was spasmodically crocheting. Her mouth was pursed in an 
odd way, as when she had dreamed the fox’s brush burned it. […] In a 
sort of semi-dream she seemed to be hearing the fox singing round the 
house in the wind, singing wildly and sweetly, like a madness. With 
red but well-shaped hands she slowly crocheted the white cotton, very 
slowly, awkwardly. (37–38, emphasis mine) 
Here the three fox figures are represented in one paragraph: Henry, who burns 
the face of March, the real fox singing, and she herself with red hands and white 
cotton.  
Foxy Ladies and Men with Guns… 17 
3.3 “Something was missing”: the bad master 
It is at this point that power-relations begin to alter, and Banford, who has not 
played a significant role up till now, begins to emerge as an important factor. A 
rivalry begins for the domination of March, who, by now, has been converted 
from a master into a masochist. 
To begin with, the importance of looking and gazing indicates that Banford 
starts to occupy the place of Henry, or rather imitate very faintly what Henry had 
done to March up till now. So far Banford’s impaired eyesight has been 
remarked upon, but has not been of utmost importance. Now she stresses that her 
eyes are bad (38) and that she does not like to look at Henry. This seems to be 
the exact opposite of Henry’s powerful male gaze; however, she tries to assign 
him a marginal position, just like Henry did to March. The real turning point 
comes when Henry and March announce that they are going to get married. 
“Never!”, Banford exclaims. Why is she so anxious? Is her newly acquired 
position (that is, her starting dominance over Henry) under threat? Or does it 
upset the “subtle” balance of March and herself, described at the beginning? 
Most probably, since in their relationship, it is March that gave her recognition 
as a master, as the “man” around the house, and now that balance is threatened 
by Henry, who is making March a masochist subject. Banford simply has to 
acquire the position of the master if she is to survive. She acts as if her life 
depended on March (“I should be dead in a month” [49]), which is true: her 
existence as a master is risked by the marriage. Naturally, it is Banford who 
thinks of Henry as a “master”: “He’d soon think he was master of both of us, he 
thinks he’s master of you already” (49–50). This statement probably serves only 
to disguise that it is she who wishes to be the master of them.  
One of the story’s climaxes is Henry’s shooting of the fox. There has been 
much discussion over why Henry kills the fox with which he is identified (cf. 
Preston 43). By now it is clear that it is another sign of Henry’s attempt to 
dominate March to the extent of her extinction, repeatedly trying to transgress 
the boundaries of the dialectics of the master and slave dichotomy. When Henry 
announces that he has killed the fox, it is March who is frightened to death—not 
surprisingly, since her existence as slave/masochist becomes jeopardised. Henry, 
not realising that he is playing a very dangerous game, offers March the fur of 
the fox to wear (symbolically trying to transform her into a fox), which March—
instinctively perhaps—refuses.  
It is in this context of the violation of the master-slave relationship that 
March’s second dream takes place. In the dream, she unconsciously tries to 
transform Banford into a fox (putting the fur under her corpse and covering her 
with the fox’s skin). What is the significance of this wish fulfilment? There are 
at least two plausible explanations. One is that March tries to put her in the 
position of Henry (as a sadistic fox), and thereby exclude him. The other 
explanation may be that she attempts to transfer the position of the fox (as 
victim) to Banford. The decision is not easy, since the first option would mean 
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that March would reintroduce the slave-master dichotomy only substituting 
Henry for Banford, the latter would mean that she wishes Banford dead, which 
would be a catastrophe for her, since it is she who used to recognise her as a 
master and now would, as a master, confirm her position as a slave.  
This tension culminates in the murder of Banford. Why does Henry kill 
her? Is it a willful act? According to the logic of the early Lawrence, “women 
tend to engulf or devour their loved ones” (Ruderman 110). In the first version 
of The Fox, Henry kills Banford because he feels that he is inextricably caught in 
her web (Ruderman 110). However, I want to suggest that both March and 
Henry have to face almost unsolvable dilemmas. After killing the fox, and 
looking at the two women approaching—naturally—in the dusk, he “realised 
that she was a woman, vulnerable, accessible, a certain heaviness had possessed 
his soul. He did not want to make love to her. He shrank from any such 
performance, almost with fear […] he held back from that which was ahead 
almost with dread” (73). By now Henry seems to be cognisant of the fact that 
instead of March he had killed the fox, but this was only a temporary solution. 
As for March, she also feels that should they continue their relationship, it would 
culminate in her extinction, and that is why she enters a new relationship with 
Banford and rejects Henry who still wants to marry her. After their separation, 
she sends a letter to Henry in which she states that “when you aren’t there, I see 
what a fool I am. When you are there, you seem to blind me to things as they 
actually are. You make me see things all unreal and I don’t know what. Then 
when I am alone again with Jill, I come to my own senses […]” (79). What 
March is longing for is the clarity of vision that she used to have when she was 
staring into the eyes of the fox, and for which she has been looking, trying to 
recreate the “original” scene. Henry’s answer to the problem is killing Banford, 
because he is dimly aware that otherwise he would kill March.  
What takes place after the murder seems to be the exact reversal of the 
original fox-scene, but actually it is a distorted version of that: “She sank down 
on the grass […]. He stood above her, looking down on her, mute, pale, and 
everlasting seeming. He never moved, but looked down on her […]. She gazed 
on him as if sightless, yet looking up to him” (92) March can never again regain 
the clear vision, the subtle and finely balanced master-slave relationship she 
once possessed for a moment, and she is doomed to have this limited, blurred 
sight. By now, however, from a “male master” she has managed to become a 
“proper” masochist: “She wanted to be alone: with him at her side” (97), which 
is exactly like the attitude of a masochist, who wants to search for aloneness with 
the other (Benjamin 72). “She wanted him to possess her, she wanted it, she 
wanted nothing else, now, still he did not quite succeed. Something was 
missing” (93). That something is precisely the security of the master-slave 
relationship, the dialectics that creates new tensions and prolongs the liaison, 
without extinguishing the other. No wonder Henry is not happy at the end, since 
he is aware of the fact that after two murders March may be, symbolically, the 
next victim. By the end of the story, alongside the five “M”s mentioned so far 
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(the progress of March from a male master to a masochist [symbolic] mother), a 
sixth “m” is introduced: melancholia, which begins to possess March, as a result 
of which she is unable to reflect on herself and her loss (Butler 23). 
By now it is clear that this narrative is not about one fox, but the position of 
a fox, the fox as a metaphor whose site is occupied by all three major characters. 
The appearance of Henry starts to subvert the (after all, not that stable) initial 
structure, and he, taking the position of a (sadistic) fox subsequently forces the 
other two women to play the same role. He pushes March from the position of a 
masculine master to that of a masochist subject (partly, perhaps motivated by 
Oedipal fantasies of destruction), and threatens her with extinction, thereby 
forcing Banford to take the position of March’s master, which leads to the death 
of the former. Henry does not prove to be a “good” master, and after killing the 
fox and Banford (Banford, the fox), he ends up in a particularly distressing 
situation, with the would-be victim March at his side.  
4 Conclusion  
In an era when social transformations profoundly questioned and redefined the 
role of women, both Garnett and Lawrence carried on negotiating the most 
prominent theme of the traditional realist novel, that is, married life and the 
position of women in these relationships. Moreover, in these two novellas, they 
managed to do this in a perfectly idiosyncratic way, using the allegory (or the 
disguise of an allegory) of the fox-tale to express profound concerns about 
domination, subjugation, identification and master and slave relationships. The 
common point in the two texts is putting women in the position of the fox, which 
unfolds the multi-layered significance of the genre of the fable. The peculiarity 
of Garnett’s “Lady into Fox” is that both Richard Tebrick, the husband, and 
Silvia Fox, the wife, may be read as fox figures, with different aspects of 
meaning. In the former case, the husband appears as a threatening Oedipal 
figure, a wild animal, in the latter, Silvia as fox may also be interpreted in two 
ways: as a free animal, wishing to lead a life of her own, and—from the 
husband’s point of view—a victim, prey, or a child (a weak figure that must be 
dominated). Both options leads to tragic consequences, that is, Silvia’s death.  
In Lawrence’s tale, the theme of domination and identification is somewhat 
more subtly elaborated. All the three principal characters (March, Banford and 
Henry) take the position of the fox, but contrary to what seems obvious at first, 
that is, the identification of Henry with the fox, it can be argued that it is 
primarily March who is conflated with the fox figure. Henry’s appearance 
repeats March’s first encounter with the real fox, which is the perfect Hegelian 
master-slave relationship. The crucial difference is that Henry is unable to 
maintain that subtle balance of the original encounter, and threatens to dissolve 
the boundaries between March and himself. After the death of the real fox and 
Branford as a fox figure, now it is March’s turn to be symbolically annihilated in 
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this male-dominated relationship. Eventually, both novellas offer new insights 
into what could be called “the psychopathology of married life.” 
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Burlap’s Angels and Daemons 
Aspects of the Mansfield Myth in Aldous Huxley’s 
Point Counter Point 
Angelika Reichmann 
Among the continental writers who had a profound impact on major figures of 
English Modernism, the Russian classic F. M. Dostoevsky ranks highly. As 
Helen Muchnic points out, Dostoevsky’s “cult-like” popularity (qtd. in Kaye 19) 
in Britain was fuelled by the publication of Constance Garnett’s translations 
starting in 1912 (cf. Kaye 1–7). He was a presence few writers of the time could 
escape—Katherine Mansfield and John Middleton Murry were no exception. 
The latter published his monograph entitled Fyodor Dostoevsky: A Critical 
Study in 1916, and, parallel with that, Mansfield devoured the Russian writer’s 
major novels (Mansfield 63–5)—an experience that would stay with her until the 
end of her short life (cf. Bényei 122). Peter Kaye even emphasises that the 
atmosphere of the period might be best described in Mansfield’s own words: in a 
1919 article of the Athenaeum she compares the London literary scene to the 
world of a Dostoevsky novel, teeming with “young gentleman-writers declaring 
(in strict confidence) that they were the real Dostoevsky” (Mansfield qtd. in 
Kaye 19). Indeed, as a fascinating episode of those times illustrates, Russianness 
or Dostoevsky’s name became popular catchwords of modernity: the evening of 
Boxing Day, 1916, saw the acting out of a half-impromptu “Ibsen-Russian play” 
penned by Mansfield at Lady Ottoline Morrell’s Garsington, in which both 
Mansfield and her husband featured—the latter as “a Dostoevsky character” 
(Alpers 227).  
It is in this context that I would like to discuss a most curious phenomenon: 
Aldous Huxley, in 1916 an ardent participant not only in this Dostoevskian play 
but also in the Russian writer’s cult-like admiration associated with Murry, 
launched, in his 1928 Point Counter Point, a harsh attack against his fellow 
writer by caricaturing him as Denis Burlap (Roston 381). Apparently, Huxley’s 
satire is focussed on Murry’s stomach-turning exploitation of his dead wife’s 
legacy by creating the Mansfield Myth, which is clearly recognisable in Burlap’s 
idolisation of his dead wife. In my analysis I will argue that this specific feature 
of Huxley’s Murry critique is not only linked to a debate with Burlap’s—
Murry’s—aesthetics, but it gains such prominence because Murry/Burlap is an 
epitome of Huxley’s major target of criticism in Point Counter Point. It is 
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nothing else but “modern romanticism”—i.e. spiritual quest as a solution for the 
dilemmas of modern consciousness—summed up for Huxley at the time in 
Dostoevsky’s name. The factors pointing in this direction include Burlap’s 
echoing of Murry’s critical ideas growing out of his Dostoevsky study over the 
1920s and his representation as a Dostoevskian figure. Through the half-comic 
fight of angels and demons for Burlap’s soul the Mansfield Myth and Murry’s 
Christian aesthetics, crystallised in his reading of Dostoevsky, are represented as 
two interrelated fictions that mutually discredit each other. 
Huxley’s satire on “modern romanticism” in Point Counter Point is, to a 
great extent, a rejection of the Dostoevskian spiritual quest, which he saw—at 
the time—as a defining feature of diseased modern consciousness. In Robert 
Baker’s analysis it is a “sustained attack” on romanticism that “governs 
Huxley’s social satire” in his major works (4). With some simplification, the 
romanticism referred to here is an intellectual and spiritual approach to life at the 
cost of denying the body. Originally rooted in Platonic philosophy and most 
prominently embodied in ascetic Christianity, in Huxley’s view romanticism in 
its “inverted” or “modern” version results in the satanic and sadistic attitudes of 
the “looking-glass Christian”—the Marquis de Sade, Baudelaire or Dostoevsky 
(On Art and Artists 183). In his 1929 essay “Baudelaire” the analogy between 
the two latter writers is expanded upon in the context of Dostoevsky’s Devils, 
the novel Point Counter Point systematically rewrites.
1
 Characteristically for the 
Dostoevsky reception of the era, Huxley identifies Dostoevsky’s most demonic 
characters with the author—in fact, he formulates his image of the writer solely 
on the basis of his demonic figures.
2
 
On the one hand, Murry offers himself as an easy target for satire in this 
context because his critical output of the period, as William Heath emphasises, 
categorises him as a “subjective romantic” (53)—with a pronouncedly Christian 
twist. By 1924 Murry coined his own definition of romanticism, which is, 
according to Heath, “divorced from historical significance” (53). In his 1924 
“Literature and Religion” Murry declares that great literature tackles a central 
issue that is religious in nature: the resolution of the paradox presented by the 
relationship of the I and the not-I, that is, the internal, spiritual world and the 
external world of necessity. A most acute awareness of this paradox is what 
defines for Murry modern, that is, rebellious post-Renaissance consciousness, 
which rejects “external spiritual authority” and “begins historically with the 
repudiation of established Christianity” (149–51) He calls this modern 
                                                     
1
 Huxley reads its main character, Stavrogin, remodelled in his own novel as Spandrell, in terms of 
psychopathology (perversion, abjection, masochism, solipsism and monomania) resulting from 
the unhealthy liberty and dominance of intelligence (On Art and Artists 178–9). 
2
 This reading deserves comparison with D. H. Lawrence’s similar interpretation of the Russian 
novelist as an embodiment of diseased modern “mental consciousness,” also based on the 
identification of the writer with his most troubled fictional characters (Kaye 44–5). 
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consciousness, in turn, Romantic (155–8).3 Throughout the essay Dostoevsky is 
one of the most often mentioned examples of Romantics in the wider sense (e.g. 
158). Not by chance: the germs of this train of thought are clearly recognisable 
in Murry’s Dostoevsky monograph, mostly in his constant emphasis on the 
disembodied, purely spiritual nature of Dostoevsky’s heroes.4 Even in that text, 
he almost idolises the most troubled, rebellious—and demonic—Dostoevskian 
characters (Svidrigaylov and Stavrogin), whom he identifies with Dostoevsky 
(58–9; 198). Thus there seems to be an almost straight line leading from Murry’s 
reading of Dostoevsky as a creator of rebellious spirits, through his concept of 
romanticism and modern consciousness, to his notoriously religious phase in his 
thirties (Frank Lea qtd. in Kimber 85). 
On the other hand, Murry might have lent himself easily to Huxley’s 
critique because in the eyes of some contemporaries he was actually identified 
with Dostoevsky. Burlap as editor of the Literary World evokes the Athenaeum 
years of Huxley’s actual contact with the Murrys, 1919 and 1920. It was the 
heyday of Dostoevskian influence in Britain, during which Murry featured in 
Huxley’s world as a “Dostoevskian character.” The novel, however, was written 
in 1927–28, and thus much later events were layered over Huxley’s personal 
reminiscences of Murry from 1916–20.5 The first of these, Huxley’s relationship 
with D. H. Lawrence, might have had a central role in both the formulation of 
Huxley’s Dostoevsky critique and the reinforcement of Murry’s rejection as a 
Dostoevskian character. As Peter Kaye describes, back in 1916 Murry’s 
posturing as the “amanuensis” of the Russian classic was most sharply criticised 
by Lawrence, his close friend then.
6
 In their heated debates Lawrence identified 
the “acolyte,” Murry with Dostoevsky himself (35–44). By 1925–26, however, 
allegiances were shifted: the Huxleys and the Lawrences, both having broken 
with the Murrys, established a close attachment to each other (cf. Cushman 
passim). Its deep impact is clearly palpable, among other things, in the close 
affinity between Lawrence’s and Huxley’s Dostoevsky critique. One cannot stop 
wondering whether Lawrence’s Dostoevskian vision of the Murrys, so bitingly 
fictionalised in Women in Love (cf. Alpers 206), also influenced Huxley’s 
                                                     
3
 Historical Romanticism is only a sub-period within this larger era which is characterised by a 
momentary mystical resolution of the above paradox (“Literature and Religion” 155). 
4
 E.g. Dostoevsky’s characters are “disembodied spirits,” whose “bodies are but symbols” (Fyodor 
Dostoevsky 47).  
5
 This overlayering is highlighted by Huxley’s method of blurring together two slightly distinctive 
historical-biographical periods in Point Counter Point through his two fictional alter egos, 
Walter Bidlake and Philip Quarles (Firchow 530). The former character—a young writer 
involved in the tedious chore of producing reviews for Burlap—clearly associates Huxley’s 
literary apprenticeship mentioned above (cf. Alpers 216–35, 290–306; Murray 111–21). 
However, Quarles—a mature writer just back from India with his wife and a five-year-old son—
points to the years 1925–26 in Huxley’s life (cf. Murray 173–85). 
6
 In fact, it was Murry’s excessive praise and somewhat idiosyncratic reading of the Russian 
classic as a “prophet” that caused a major break between Murry and Lawrence (Kaye 35–44). 
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understanding of Murry as the embodiment of Dostoevskian, diseased modern 
consciousness. The other sad event that played a crucial role in the shaping of 
Burlap’s character was Mansfield’s death in 1923. The Mansfield industry 
working at full power by 1925–27 served as a convenient target7 and an easy 
tool for the revelation of the falsity behind Murry’s “Dostoevskian” spiritual 
stance both as a critic and a human individual. 
It is so because certain elements of the Mansfield Myth, whose constants 
were formulated by Murry on its emergence, right after Mansfield’s death (cf. 
Meyers 24–5), seem to reverberate the terms and rhetoric of his religious-
romantic aesthetics: the myth seems to be both a product and a justification of 
Murry’s critical theory. First and foremost, Murry’s accent on spirituality clearly 
finds its echo in depriving Mansfield of her body.
8
 As several critics have 
pointed out, what remains of her in the myth is a disembodied spirit (Meyers 19–
21; Kimber 81)—an “otherworldly” creature (Kimber 74), an angel. But this 
angel, if she also wants to be an artist of the higher order, must also embark on a 
religious/spiritual quest. And indeed, as Gerri Kimber does not fail to emphasise, 
the transformation of Mansfield’s whole artistic career into a systematic mystical 
quest was so successful, that her reception in France, for example, is often 
spoken about in terms of hagiography (72–84). Nevertheless, to rank among the 
greatest, she must also be a Romantic; hence, as it has been often noticed, she is 
mentioned consistently together with Shelley, Keats and Blake (Meyers 32, cf. 
Murry, “Katherine Mansfield” 54–64).9  
Needless to point out, it is the satirical representation of this mytholigising 
in Huxley’s novel that most prominently identifies Burlap with Murry. Burlap 
creates a fictional image of his dead wife, Susan, as a child-like, fully spiritual, 
angelic creature—a household saint—in a “more than usually painful series of 
[...] always painfully personal articles” (Huxley, Point Counter Point 172). 
Susan is replaced by a “phantom” (Huxley, Point 73) whose sole importance is 
that she is a major prop for authenticating Burlap’s narcissistic role-playing as 
the devout admirer of absolute spiritual beauty. The role involves wallowing in 
grief and producing “abject” scenes—self-humiliating emotional outbursts.10 
The phantom and the disgusting scenes result from a process which Huxley 
tellingly describes through an analogy with the “churning up” of emotions in the 
                                                     
7
 Huxley also gave vent to his distaste for it in the essay “The Traveller’s Eye View” in 1925 
(qtd. in Kimber 75). 
8
 A body, that was not only prominently physical—because ill—but also transgressively so: a 
female, lesbian and somewhat promiscuous body torn not only by the romantic and 
mentionable illness of tuberculosis but also by STD. 
9
 Her aesthetically perceived death in the myth evokes instances of the cruellest romantic 
treatment of the female body: Poe’s fascination with the death of the child-like beautiful 
woman as the most proper subject matter and inspiration for art. 
10
 They are highly reminiscent of Dostoevskian novels, a connection clearly indicated by the 
phrase “spiritual masturbation” (Huxley, Point 173), which features both in the novel and 
Huxley’s Baudelaire essay. 
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meditations of a Jesuit novice to evoke “a vivid, mystical and personal 
realisation of the Saviour’s real existence and sufferings” (Huxley, Point 173).11 
Indeed, Huxley gives a sharp-eyed description of Murry’s creation of the 
Mansfield Myth as hagiography in his rather distasteful personal outpourings 
sold as literary criticism. 
Huxley is also a keen-eyed perceiver of the connection between the angelic 
Mansfield image and Murry’s spiritual-romantic-Dostoevskian posturing as a 
literary critic: Burlap’s catchword is spirituality both in his fictional narrative of 
his dead wife and in his critical credo. Just as with Murry’s reputation, in which 
according to Meyers the handling of Mansfield’s heritage discredits his stance as 
a literary critic (38), in the novel these two versions of “spirituality” mutually 
undermine each other. One of them, the angelic Susan’s narrative is a cover-
story that both saves Burlap from the effort of building up mature emotional-
sexual relationships, and serves as his major tool for seducing women into his 
bed both before and after his wife’s death: 
he had such a pure, child-like and platonic way of going to bed with 
women, that neither they nor he ever considered that the process really 
counted as going to bed. [...] Susan died [...]. [In front of Ethel Cobbet] 
he plunged into an orgy of regrets, [...] of repentances, excruciating for 
being too late, of unnecessary confessions and self-abasements. [...] A 
broken-hearted child in need of consolation, he would have liked to 
lure his consoler, ever so spiritually and platonically, into a gentle and 
delicious incest. (Huxley, Point 174–5, emphasis added) 
Burlap’s other version of spirituality, his critical credo also reeks of 
inauthenticity: he portentously sounds it to everyone willing to listen, 
ridiculously regurgitating his own editorials, like pre-written theatrical roles. 
This is the impression he makes right from his first appearance: his introduction 
during a literary discussion with a Mrs Betterton at a party. During the evening, 
Burlap declares that “A great artist [...] is a man who synthesises all experience”, 
yet “there are more spiritual than bodily experiences,” and by implication these 
are the “great subjects” that define great artists (Huxley, Point 67–8). 
Presumably, under the influence of their lofty discussion Mrs Betterton sees 
Burlap’s face as “spiritual” and therefore “beautiful” (Huxley, Point 67), while 
young Walter Bidlake, who has just faced the same ideas in the proof of next 
                                                     
11
 As Jeffrey Meyers highlights, these elements point to Huxley’s acute perception of such 
components of the Mansfield machinery as “the falseness of the cult,” “Murry’s pitiful 
exploitation of his grief”, the “emotional immaturity and childish role-playing of both Murry 
and Katherine” and “the destructive aspect of Murry’s ‘mystical’ love [described] in the 
metaphor of sexual perversion” (17–8). 
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week’s editorial, cannot help but find them “rather ridiculous” (Huxley, Point 
69).
12
  
The inauthenticity of Burlap’s spiritual stance—and by implication the 
untenable nature of the kind of spiritual-Dostoevskian solution Murry embodies 
for Huxley—is further underscored by at least two most Dostoevskian motifs in 
Burlap’s character. The first is his split consciousness represented through the 
devil as his hallucinatory double. It is a distinctive feature of a favourite 
Dostoevsky character for Murry: Stavrogin. Similarly to Ivan Karamazov’s devil 
it indicates his irreversible identity crisis and ontological insecurity. In Burlap’s 
case the motif is devoid of the tragic Dostoevskian overtones: his own petty 
devil evokes a parodistic, sacrilegious morality play as a rather ironic reflection 
of Murry’s own reading of Dostoevsky’s novels as tragic “moral allegories” 
(Heath 56).
13
 Rather comically, Burlap has the annoying habit of talking to one 
as if “he were addressing some little personage invisible to everyone but himself 
[...] his private daemon, perhaps; an emanation of himself, his Doppelgänger” 
(Huxley, Point 66). Whenever Burlap pronounces one of his hypocritical, 
sententious statements, his other, sceptical, ironic, and honestly immoral self—
his demon or devil—interferes. Thus, when Burlap rejects the idea of a cynic as 
a great artist in the discussion quoted above, in his thoughts, the “mocking devil” 
immediately chips: “Though why you want to make an impression [...] unless 
it’s because she’s rich and useful, goodness knows” (Huxley, Point 67).14 A sign 
of Dostoevskian-romantic self-division, rebellion and ontological crisis, the 
devil turns into a comic device for revealing Burlap’s rather unextraordinary 
hypocrisy. This is also a caricature of Murry’s—and Dostoevsky’s—affiliation 
with established Christian churches, since Burlap is the one character in the 
novel who is most consistently associated with an overtly religious stance, more 
particularly with Catholicism. 
Finally, the utter falsity of Burlap’s spiritual stance is revealed by a second 
Dostoevskian motif: the archetypal crime in several of his texts, driving a 
child/woman to suicide. Among other Dostoevskian characters, Stavrogin drives 
a child to take this fatal step in Devils by sexually abusing her, while arguably in 
The Idiot Mishkin’s inability to acknowledge Nastasya Philippovna as a physical 
                                                     
12
 The ironic intertwining of Burlap’s two fictions of spirituality is further emphasised by the fact 
that in this scene he mentally relegates Mrs Betterton—a woman of much material wealth, but 
of rather limited understanding, ungainly appearance and adulterous past—“to the side of the 
angels” (Huxley, Point 67) simply because she provides a faithful audience to his posturing as a 
prophet of spirituality. 
13
 Burlap’s dividedness is the first piece of information about him: he is both “a movie villain and 
St Anthony of Padua” (Huxley, Point 67) and his epitheton ornans is his “Sodoma smile” 
(Huxley, Point 69). The latter is an ingenious pun on the two meanings of Sodoma: the more 
well-known Biblical one, and a reference to a Renaissance painter, contemporary of Leonardo 
da Vinci—by implication a painter associated with the Gioconda smile. 
14
 To add to this irony, it is right after this comment that Burlap recognises Mrs Betterton as an 
angel. 
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and sexual being is also a major factor in her suicidal return to Rogozhin, which 
leads to her murder. Huxley repeats Murry’s reading strategy of blurring the 
boundaries between all kinds of Dostoevsky characters—saints and villains (cf. 
Kaye 38)—here: Burlap drives Ether Cobbett to suicide under the cover-story of 
a Mishkin-like pure spirituality, but his real motifs are those of Stavrogin-like 
seduction. In fact, Ethel kills herself not because she is seduced, but because she 
is ultimately rejected, though it is so because seeing through the hypocrisy of 
Burlap’s platonic love—the thing that makes her fall for him in the first place—
makes it impossible for her to succumb to his advances. Burlap manages to lure 
Ethel, his dead wife’s schoolmate, to London with his pathetic role of the 
grieving widow, but she takes it too seriously and falls in love with him because 
of the romantic image Burlap creates about Susan. Naturally, she finds his 
narrative of pure spirituality incompatible with his attempts to start an affair with 
her, and working for him as a secretary she becomes a burden after rejecting his 
advances. The novel culminates with Burlap’s summoning up his courage to 
finally get rid of her when he has found his ideal partner: Beatrice, who takes 
part willingly in his game of childlike innocence and spirituality; she idolises 
him—and most platonically goes to bed with him. Ethel’s love for Burlap—and 
thus ultimately her suicide after her dismissal—is the product of his fiction of 
spirituality. Thus her story makes a powerfully ironic comment on the mortally 
harmful aspects of what Huxley conceives to be Dostoevskian spirituality.  
This might suffice to illustrate that Huxley’s satire on Murry in Point 
Counter Point is far from being an arbitrary personal attack that has lost all its 
significance for today’s readers. It seems to be rather an organic part of Huxley’ 
concern with modern consciousness, with the dilemmas the individual has to 
face in the modern world, and with the function of literature in their 
representation and potential resolution. One kind of solution—spiritual quest—
was summed up in the name of Dostoevsky at the time, but for the Huxley of the 
late 1920s it appeared to be unacceptable. He satirises Murry as the closest thing 
available to the original. The creation of the Mansfield Myth—the figurative 
destruction of the female body which serves as a stage for the poet-creator to 
parade on as a prophet of spiritual truth—made Murry an easy target both 
because it repeats a Dostoevskian motif and because it simultaneously sums up 
and undermines Murry’s critical stance. Not that Huxley’s regurgitation of 
Lawrence’s gospel of blood-consciousness through Rampion as his mouthpiece 
in the novel stood the test of time. However, his ingenious satire clearly 
illustrates how devastating myth-making is at least in one respect. Huxley never 
associates Burlap’s wife, Susan, with literature. Thus he most effectively 
demonstrates how Katherine Mansfield, the brilliant woman writer disappears—
within five years of her death—behind the angelic figure of the Mansfield Myth 
in fictional and non-fictional worlds of critical debate, male rivalry and devilish 
counterfeit. The mythical angel—similarly to that other, more famous 
“phantom” of Virginia Woolf—kills. 
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Districts and Circles 
Péter Dolmányos 
The relationship between Seamus Heaney and the Tollund Man has become 
virtually metonymic. The widely anthologised poem “The Tollund Man” is 
generally considered trade-mark Heaney with all its laconic ambivalence and 
quasi-religious tone. The tentative parallel between past and present outlined in 
the poem facilitated a more comprehensive assessment of the potential of the 
motif which was subsequently re-examined and reconsidered, and though the 
aesthetic aspect remained consistent, Heaney discovered inadequacies in the 
parallel and concluded his sequence of bog-poems on a tone of resignation. The 
promise of the original parallel, however, proved tempting to occasion another 
return to it in a moment of historic significance. The poem “Tollund” was based 
on the same tentative parallel as “The Tollund Man”, reinstating the relation, this 
time in the form of a peaceful rural world, between Jutland and Northern Ireland 
with the implicit idea that the sacrifice was perhaps not in vain.  
Though Heaney’s most recent collection, District and Circle takes its title 
from names in the London underground, wider implications of the title are also 
possible as several poems of the collection revisit earlier topics or openly allude 
to poems from Heaney’s oeuvre. Among these there is a return to the figure of 
the Tollund Man, who is resurrected in a sequence of sonnets entitled “The 
Tollund Man in Springtime.” Heaney evokes familiar districts—primarily 
Jutland, both old and new, the home of the Tollund Man, and by allusion a wider 
world including his own homeland. The return, yet another one, creates the 
impression of circles, and as the sonnets constitute a circular structure in their 
sequence, there appears a Joycean technique at work in the considerably 
enlarged set of bog-poems.  
Heaney’s interest in the bog had its first expression in the seminal poem 
“Bogland”, yet the first real and at once typical bog-poem was “The Tollund 
Man” as it provided the first character in a series of encounters with people from 
the past. The poem opens with a description of the body embedded in the image 
of an imaginary pilgrimage to the present location of its remains, and then 
moves on to a tentative invocation and an even more tentative identification with 
the experience of the contemplated figure; Heaney uses these latter two sections 
to negotiate his imaginative parallel between the distant world of the Iron Age 
community of Jutland and the contemporary society of the Troubles of Northern 
Ireland. The description of the body follows what was to become the ‘classical’ 
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Heaney pattern in the later bog-poems: the body is described in terms of the bog 
itself, evoking Wordsworthian dimensions of at-one-ness with the surrounding 
world, and at the same time this technique diminishes the shock of the otherwise 
explicit reference to the status of the Tollund Man as a victim of a sacrificial 
cult. The invocation builds on this ennobled image of the figure: the “saint’s 
kept body” (Heaney, New Selected Poems 1966–1987, 31) becomes the proper 
figure to address in the hope of a better world beyond the violent conflict of the 
present. Heaney’s persona even suggests a sharing of the experience of the 
victim during his envisioned pilgrimage, leading him to a rather disquieting 
conclusion:  
 
Out there in Jutland 
In the old man-killing parishes 
I will feel lost, 
Unhappy and at home.  
(Heaney, New Selected Poems 1966–1987, 32) 
 
Heaney’s gesture in the last section of the poem has drawn doubts concerning 
the nature of his sharing of the victim’s experience. (cf. Parker 108: “Motoring 
through a foreign country hardly seems a comparable experience […].”) 
However far-fetched the parallel between a sacrificial victim and a leisurely 
tourist may be, Heaney still has a point: the bold overstatement of the kinship of 
their feelings leads to the rather disillusioned closure of the poem in which the 
concept of ‘home’ is revised along the complicated confines of the conflict-
ridden home province of the poet. The paradoxical relation of being at once 
“lost, / Unhappy and at home” is also indicative of Heaney’s stance in relation to 
the conflict itself as he attempts to stay clear of openly taking sides yet cannot 
fully ignore his own position as a Northern Catholic, with all his experience of 
grievances and discrimination.  
Heaney returns to the bog-motif in his volume North on a larger scale. 
There is a section in the first part of the collection which creates a myth of the 
motif with an adequate narrative pattern to it, and this myth is in turn embedded 
in the myth of the North outlined by the whole of the collection. The section of 
the bog-poems complements the achievement of “The Tollund Man” by 
providing a variety of characters who are recruited to sustain the imaginative 
parallel between the past and the present, yet Heaney is honest enough to 
acknowledge the limitations of his construct, and in the concluding poem of the 
section (“Kinship”) he takes up the position of the detached observer who has no 
intention to dignify any further what has become in his eyes the simple and raw 
fact of murder.  
Though North provides a gallery of bog-characters, the Tollund Man is 
missing from the collection. Instead, another victim of the cult is portrayed, yet 
the Grauballe Man does not receive the same elevated status of the earlier figure: 
though the initial description is done in similar terms, there is a strong contrast 
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between the “repose” of the Tollund Man and the horrific sight of the slashed 
throat of the Grauballe Man. This leads to a more complex evaluation of the 
figure at the end of the poem as “beauty and atrocity” (Heaney, North, 29) are 
linked to each other in the final moments of contemplation, and this time the 
Heaney-persona does not hint at any form of shared experience.  
Heaney’s first return to the Tollund Man, or rather, to his emblematic role 
was undertaken in the poem “Tollund”, published in the volume The Spirit 
Level, well after he seemed to have abandoned the bog-motif. The figure is not 
explicitly conjured but the allusion to the earlier poem is impossible to miss: the 
poem is an account of a visit to the place where the Tollund Man was found, and 
the occasion is of historic significance as the poem is dated “September 1994” 
(Heaney, The Spirit Level, 69), making a clear-cut reference to the IRA 
ceasefire, which effectively brought to an end a 25-year-long period of civil 
unrest and violence. Writing in 1998, Helen Vendler suggested that “’Tollund’ 
can stand for a poem of Afterwards, marking […] one’s response in a post-
catastrophic moment” (Vendler 156). 
In “The Tollund Man” Heaney’s persona promised a pilgrimage to 
contemplate the remains of the Iron Age man. This promise is fulfilled here yet 
“Tollund” focuses on the location of the bog where the discovery happened 
rather than on a visit to a museum with its carefully arranged display of 
reconstructed history. The place is approached as a location in nature, though the 
description is proportionately shared between the bog and the altered landscape 
of country life. There is an eye on the touristic significance of the place too, yet 
no conflict arises out of this communion of nature and civilisation, the scene is 
that of near-pastoral harmony.  
In contrast with the desperate conditions at the time of writing “The 
Tollund Man”, “Tollund” is characterised by a markedly different atmosphere. 
The form of the poem also embodies this difference as the leisurely long lines 
conclude in neat patterns of enclosed rhymes, which is in stark contrast with the 
narrow, and nearly claustrophobic, drilling-like and unrhymed lines of “The 
Tollund Man”. As the persona’s eyes follow the orderly modern world, there is a 
cataloguing of the landmarks: Heaney makes a list of the items of the modern 
landscape and this list-like account with its slow movement further contributes 
to the relaxed atmosphere of the poem. The masterful juxtaposition of the 
scarecrow and the satellite dish hints at the peaceful reconciliation of old and 
new, which prepares for the re-establishment of Heaney’s earlier parallel 
between the past of Jutland and the present of his home district through a simple 
use of place names from the latter. Heaney never ventures farther than this in 
making his point: the rather low-key sentence “Things had moved on” (Heaney, 
The Spirit Level, 69) solves his problem in a majestic way by suggesting a 
continuity of experience between the world of the Tollund Man and the present 
in the same location with the implication that fertility has been granted in the 
long run through the figure of the sacrificial victim. This is as yet only a hope in 
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relation to Northern Ireland, but the moment of a historic ceasefire is an 
indication of a possible new world.  
The possibility of a new beginning is expressed through an allusion to a 
passage in Shakespeare, as Heaney explains it, but he provides the borrowed 
image with his own landmarks too:  
One of the most beautiful passages in Shakespeare has to do with an 
old belief about the spirit walking abroad after death but having to 
return to purgatory at dawn when the cocks crow and the light 
brightens. In the next poem, however, I will revise this superstition and 
end with an image of ghosts coming back to life, re-entering the light 
and managing to begin again with a new energy and resolution. 
(Stepping Stones, comment preceding the poem “Tollund”) 
Something of the ambivalence of the conclusion of “The Tollund Man” survives 
into this poem as the “Hallucinatory and familiar” nature of the experience is 
described at the beginning of the poem and as paradoxical phrases indicate the 
persona’s stance at the end: “it was user-friendly outback / Where we stood 
footloose, at home beyond the tribe” (Heaney, The Spirit Level, 69). The new 
beginning is one without earlier constraints though not without previous 
experience—this is indicated by the final stanza of the poem:  
 
More scouts than strangers, ghosts who’d walked abroad  
Unfazed by light, to make a new beginning 
And make a go of it, alive and sinning,  
Ourselves again, free-willed again, not bad. (ibid) 
 
Though the figure of the Tollund Man does not appear in the poem, it is apropos 
the figure itself that the location acquires significance. The place would possess 
little power if it were not for the man, and it is exactly this imaginative appeal 
lent to the location by the human figure that Heaney deliberately exploits in the 
chosen moment. The same deliberate effort was not present at the writing of the 
first poem as Heaney claims:  
The Tollund Man seemed to me like an ancestor almost, one of my old 
uncles, one of those moustached archaic faces you used to meet all 
over the Irish countryside. I felt very close to this. And the sacrificial 
element, the territorial religious element, the whole mythological field 
surrounding these images was very potent. So I tried, not explicitly, to 
make a connection between the sacrificial, ritual, religious element in 
the violence of contemporary Ireland and this terrible sacrificial 
religious thing in The Bog People. This wasn’t thought out. It began 
with a genuinely magnetic, almost entranced relationship with those 
heads. … And when I wrote that poem (‘The Tollund Man’) I had the 
Districts and Circles 35 
sense of crossing a line really, that my whole being was involved in the 
sense of—the root sense—of religion, being bonded to something, 
being bound to do something. I felt it a vow; I felt my whole being 
caught in this. (Heaney quoted by Kirkland 258–9)  
With the second poem, however, Heaney could safely build on a foundation 
which has been tested (though not unequivocally shared by every member of the 
audience), and there is a self-conscious literary foundation for the later poem 
beyond Shakespeare:  
[…] [“Tollund”] was written after the IRA ceasefire of August 1994. 
The Sunday after that historic Wednesday I just happened to be for the 
first time in this bog in Jutland where they had found the body of the 
Tollund Man about whom I’d written about 24 years earlier. The mood 
of this more recent poem is as different from the earlier one as the dark 
mood of the early 1970s in Ulster was from the more sanguine mid 
‘90s. (Stepping Stones, comment preceding the poem “Tollund”) 
The bog-poems of North represented a resurrection of the motif and 
considerably widened the circle of its characters yet they did not involve the 
Tollund Man. Heaney’s latest collection, however, finds an occasion for the 
figure to come to life again and Heaney is generous enough to endow the figure 
with life and even a voice, so that it can recount experience from a personal 
perspective. As Heaney himself explains it,  
[…] in a new start that was both unexpected and exhilarating, I 
returned to a figure who had given me rare poetic strength more than 
30 years earlier. I began a sequence of sonnets in the voice of the 
Tollund Man; this Iron Age revenant was, as they used to say in stage 
directions, ‘discovered’ in a new setting, keeping step with me in the 
world of surveillance cameras and closed-circuit TV, of greenhouse 
gases and acid rain. He functioned as a kind of guardian other, risen 
out of the Jutland bog to ‘gather / From the display-case peat his 
staying powers’. The convention is to call such a figure a ‘persona’ but 
in this case he felt more like a transfusion […] (Heaney, The Times, 
March 25, 2006) 
“The Tollund Man in Springtime” is a sequence of sonnets. Heaney opts for the 
form for its inherent system of balance and dynamism, for its subtle organisation 
of its parts towards constructing a whole which is at once more than the sum of 
its components. Heaney, however, seems to prefer the more organic romantic 
version of the sonnet rather than the traditional Renaissance structure with its 
neat division into easily identifiable units. The closure of the last sonnet is linked 
with the beginning of the first one, which creates a circular structure in the 
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sequence: the figure has to be resurrected first to be able to recount the story of 
his resurrection.  
The first of the sonnets outlines the context of the revival of the figure, 
dropping him into the contemporary world. Heaney employs the Future Perfect 
to indicate the coming to a new life of the figure, and the modern world is 
quickly evoked through an imagery of “scans, screens, hidden eyes” (Heaney, 
District and Circle, 55). The status of the figure, however, remains something of 
a mystery, self-definition stops short as he is “neither god nor ghost, / Not at 
odds or at one” (ibid). The only concrete elements mentioned are those of the 
bog, with its unique communion of “seeding grass” and “Dead bracken” (ibid), 
reminiscent of the basic cycle of the natural world. This builds a contrast 
between the temporal world of the bog and the timeless figure of the speaker as 
the former is adequately defined by its elements whereas the latter is stranded in 
the act of interpreting himself.  
The resurrected figure has drawn energies from his ‘dormant’ state 
according to his own claims: “I reawoke to revel in the spirit / They strengthened 
when they chose to put me down / For their own good” (Heaney, District and 
Circle, 55). The resurrection runs parallel with an understanding and an act of 
forgiveness towards the event of his sacrifice, which is in concord with Heaney’s 
observation of the “repose” of the character in “The Tollund Man”. The past 
indeed is closed down, and the changed surroundings provide a different kind of 
threat for the figure, “a sixth-sensed threat” (ibid) of the modern world, “Clear 
alteration in the bog-pooled rain” (ibid). Alteration works on multiple levels as 
the normally short-term literal change from night to day becomes a far-reaching 
metaphorical one for the figure, and the whole world surrounding the bog has 
also undergone a profound change since the Tollund Man last contemplated it.  
In the second poem the main resource of the bog, peat is explored, and the 
self-definition of the Tollund Man is complemented by this element. Peat is the 
proto-form of coal, a rather meagre source of energy which is “Ashless, 
flameless, its very smoke a sullen / Waft of swamp-breath” (Heaney, District 
and Circle, 55) as it never fully loses its water content even if it is left to dry in 
the sun for a long time. The Tollund Man ‘enjoyed’ a communion with this 
substance until his discovery, yet the approach to the figure in terms of this 
material is a new element in his description. The moment of discovery is seen in 
religious terms borrowed from Christianity: the “unrisen” figure comes to light 
when “the levered sod / Got lifted up” (ibid), and as a result, the Tollund Man is 
resituated in the Christian universe as a creation specifically placed in the bog:  
 
[…]; then once I felt the air 
I was like turned turf in the breath of God,  
Bog-bodied on the sixth day, brown and bare,  
And on the last, all told, unatrophied. (ibid) 
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With the allusion to the Creation the Tollund Man is safely established in his 
own private mythology which is reconciled with Christianity.  
The third poem offers a catalogue of the body of the Tollund Man, or 
rather, of what has remained of it. It is only the head which is still displayed in a 
museum as the rest of the body was sacrificed to scientific investigations, and 
the description focuses on this item as it is carefully arranged on display. The 
verbless list of the parts and features of the head contrasts with the past tense of 
the “phantom head / And arm and leg and shoulder” (Heaney, District and 
Circle, 56) which also hints at the long period between the burial of the victim 
and the discovery of his remains. That long period was one with a mutual 
relation between the body and its surroundings: it was a time “when the bog pith 
weighed / To mould me to itself and it to me” (ibid), which is at once a self-
reflexive commentary on Heaney’s use of the figure and the whole bog-myth as 
it suggests the evolution of the motif in Heaney’s sequence on the bog people. 
There is an allusion to the poem “The Tollund Man” too: the invocation of the 
poem is recalled as “Faith placed in me” (ibid), and the reference to the head 
being “On show for years while all that lay in wait / Still waited” (ibid) echoes 
the relation of “The Tollund Man” to “Tollund”.  
The paradoxical idea of faith placed in the man while he was faithless as a 
sacrificial victim at first and a museum item later finds its analogue in the image 
of “a stone / The harrow turned up when the crop was sown” (ibid). The 
accidental discovery is at once an act of unsettling, and this evokes Yeats and his 
stone that troubles the living stream—and indeed the victims of the 
contemporary violence create their own ‘troubles’ for the living, and tentatively 
they also function as the Yeatsean stone, with all its ambiguity: the stone 
unsettles the course of the stream yet it is also what shocks it out of its inertia 
and gives it a new direction. The invocation to the Tollund Man, blasphemous as 
it may have been, served exactly the same purpose: by evading the direct 
confrontation of the contemporary world, it launched a course of profound 
enquiry into the nature of violence related to religion and territory. 
This richly evocative section is concluded by a relaxed yet enigmatic pair of 
lines: “Out in the Danish night I’d hear soft wind / And remember moony water in 
a rut” (ibid). Neither time nor space is satisfactorily specified—the past habitual 
“would” does not make it clear whether it happened before the discovery or 
between that and the present reawakening of the figure, and similarly the “out in 
the Danish night” is vague enough to create a sense of ambiguity. The peaceful 
associations of the experience, however, are clear and they further strengthen the 
intertextual relation of the present poem with the earlier ones.  
The fourth sonnet of the sequence concentrates on the Tollund Man’s 
reconstruction of himself. The museum item enacts a process of re-creation in a 
rather ingenious way: the reconstruction is a tentative rejuvenation course based 
purely on the power of the word. The self-empowered logos ushers in the return 
of sensation: seeing, hearing and smelling are all recovered not only to revive 
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the Tollund Man but also to relocate him in Heaney’s usual poetic world which 
is dominated by a rich combination of these sensory fields.  
The newly rejuvenated figure sets out on a course of learning. His education 
is conducted by an observation of cattle in the rain: it is “their knowledgeable / 
Solid standing and readiness to wait” (Heaney, District and Circle, 57) which 
provides the example with a strong emphasis on the element of patience and 
accompanying wisdom. Contemplation uncovers previous experience: “Of 
another world, unlearnable, and so / To be lived by, whatever it was I knew / 
Came back to me” (ibid). The lived but so far not contemplated and interpreted 
experience returns, yet it is at odds with the present of “check-out lines” and 
“cash-points” (ibid), thus the figure appears as a strange bystander, as “Bulrush, 
head in air, far from its lough” (ibid). 
Despite modern techniques and equipment the Tollund Man manages to 
preserve a secret of his own, corresponding to his mental separation from the 
present. “Through every check and scan I carried with me / A bunch of Tollund 
rushes” (Heaney, District and Circle, 57): by carrying pollen on his skin the 
figure steals something out of his old world and into the new, driven by the hope 
of bringing it back to life again, yet it eludes him: “I had hoped they’d stay / 
Damp until transplanted,” but “they went musty” (ibid). The recognition leaves 
the figure with a dilemma as to the possibility of continuity which becomes 
resonant with self-reflexive considerations on the part of the poet too:  
 
Dust in my palm  
And in my nostrils dust, should I shake it off  
Or mix it in with spit in pollen’s name  
And my own? (ibid) 
 
The resolution, however, is quickly made, and in another instance of self-
reflexive allusion the figure decides in favour of giving it a try: “As a man 
would, cutting turf, / I straightened, spat on my hands, felt benefit / And spirited 
myself into the street” (ibid). This resolution also includes a reference to the first 
sonnet of the sequence (“Into your virtual city I’ll have passed”), thus the circle 
is made full at the end of the last poem: the Tollund Man has been resurrected 
and now he can recount his resurrection.  
The dilemma of the Tollund Man is on one level that of continuity, shared 
by Heaney himself. The question whether an imaginative parallel can be drawn 
between Iron Age Jutland and modern Northern Ireland is asked by the poem 
“The Tollund Man”, yet it is only partly answered by it, thus Heaney makes a 
return to the motif. This in itself is another instance of the dilemma, and so is the 
latest revisiting of the topic through the resurrection of the Tollund Man in the 
new sequence. The choice of the poet to involve the figure once again implies 
his conviction that his initial idea was potent but at the same time it admits the 
persistence of his doubts concerning its validity, and the new approach to the 
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figure, though it generously avoids explicit references to the violent cult of the 
past, serves as a reinforcement of the imaginative power of the Tollund Man. 
The allusion to the turf-cutter, a possible reference to the grandfather of the poet 
as evoked in the poem “Digging” suggests a similar drive to strengthen the belief 
in the possibility of continuity despite a radical presence of discontinuity 
between the occupations of the family members of different generations, and in 
this way another circle is closed and thus made full—at least for the time being. 
The poem “The Tollund Man” employed the framework of an imaginary 
pilgrimage, a promise for the future emerging from a finding from the past. The 
figure is excavated yet this does not correspond to a resurrection, and it is 
exclusively the observing speaker who governs the poem. “Tollund” depicts a 
world in the time of late summer and early autumn, a world at the height of its 
powers in which nothing is explicitly reminiscent of sacrifice. It is only through 
the significance Heaney attributes to the place that the past is evoked and the 
figure looms in the imaginative background. “The Tollund Man in Springtime” 
functions then both as the ‘missing link’ as well as a new beginning. The poem 
brings the old association of rebirth yet the title is also a reminder of spring as a 
part of the regular cycle, a recurring element rather than a peculiar one. Still, the 
revival of the figure is a unique occasion and Heaney is cunning enough to 
exclude references to the regular recurrence of the cycle itself.  
Some of the reviewers of District and Circle question the wisdom and 
purpose of returning to the figure, seeing no real advancement in comparison 
with the earlier poems (cf. Wooten; Wheatley). Yet it is part of the traditional 
Heaney tactics of self-enquiry, self-testing and necessary revision. This drive 
occasions returns to earlier motifs and themes in his poetry, thus it is an act of 
complementation, of making the circle full, which is regularly practiced by 
Heaney. Speaking about the aestheticisation of the bog bodies, Helen Vendler 
raises the question: “What would the corpse himself say posthumously about his 
own state?” (Vendler 45) With “The Tollund Man in Springtime” Heaney 
answers this question in a comprehensive way, moreover, he compels his subject 
to face not only himself but an altered world as well. The overwhelmingly 
different environment into which the Tollund Man steps still leaves some space 
for him to contemplate himself and this leads to the humanisation of the figure—
he is no longer a museum item, a curious memorial of the past but there opens 
about him a genuinely human dimension, however limited that may be.  
The resurrection of the figure has yet another dimension in relation to the 
previous elements of the motif. “Bog Queen” in North resurrected the goddess of 
the Iron Age cult, though the long waiting of the goddess did not pass without 
the process of disintegration (cf. Vendler 45). The reawakening of the remains of 
the Tollund Man is carried out through a similar process, thus the coming to life 
of the figure now provides what appears to be a fitting bridegroom to the 
goddess: as he was in his death, so he will be in his new life—bridegroom to the 
goddess in winter and a revived bridegroom to the revived goddess in spring. 
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The symbolic sacrifice is now balanced by a symbolic resurrection, and yet 
another circle is completed.  
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Although the relationship between literature and philosophy is 
sanctioned by a long tradition, such a link reveals many limitations: 
philosophically anchored text analyses are subjective, 
impressionistic and reductive in their use of “text-active models” 
(Holland 1995). Cognitive poetics (Tsur 1992; Stockwell 2002), a 
burgeoning school of literary criticism, avoids those traps by re-
shifting its attention to the reader’s mind and by “applying the 
principles of cognitive science to the interpretation of literary texts” 
(Louwerse & van Peer 424). In doing so, it attempts to build a 
bridge between the sciences and the humanities. Despite its 
refreshing approach, CP is still banished to the margins of 
criticism; the reason being that it is seen by the humanities as: (1) 
foregrounding the cognitive at the expense of the poetic (Danaher 
2) and (2) relying too heavily on cognitive neuroscience. This paper 
explores to what extent cognitive science has influenced the field of 
literary studies. Through examination of three seminal books on CP 
(Stockwell 2002; Gavins and Steen 2003; Brône and Vandaele 
2009) and the essay “Music and Movement” (2012) by Lawrence 
Zbikowski, it aims both (1) to demarcate the boundaries between 
the cognitive and the poetic in selected cognitive analyses of 
literary texts and (2) to explore to what extent the application of 
scientific theories has had an impact on the language cognitive 
scholars use in their papers. Finally, this paper argues that if CP is 
to be recognized as a reliable methodology, it should borrow 
insights from reception theory and go truly empirical. 
The past few decades have witnessed intensified efforts to challenge the 
predominance of post-structuralism in literary studies. Apart from engendering 
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interdisciplinary projects and collaborations
1
 between neuropsychologists and 
literary critics, these efforts have led to insights into literary emotion (Antonio 
Damasio 1994, 2000)
2
 and growing interest among cognitive scholars (George 
Lakoff, Mark Turner or Gilles Fauconnier) in domains that are traditionally 
ascribed to literature. These developments indeed account for the shift from a 
cultural to a more neurological focus that has been taking place in literary 
studies. In spite of the long-standing relationship between literature and 
philosophy, this gradual paradigm shift has revealed many limitations in 
philosophically anchored post-structuralist studies. It has shown them to be 
subjective, impressionistic and reductive in their focus on “text-active models” 
(Holland 1995). Clearly, a number of concurrent approaches that have arrived 
relatively recently on the academic scene, suffice it to mention neuroaesthetics 
(Zeki 1999), evolutionary humanism (Carroll 1995)
3
 and cognitive poetics 
(Stockwell 2002), attempt to avoid those traps by viewing literature in particular, 
and art in general, as strongly linked to the mind and the body.
4
 Their resistance 
to the post-structuralist doctrines of textuality and indeterminacy aside, these 
three disciplines are united by their emphasis on the biological aspects of the 
creative process. In his introduction to neuroaesthetics (2009), Zeki makes a 
convincing case for “studying the neural basis of visual art” by articulating the 
obvious: “Art […] as a human activity […] depends upon, and obeys, the laws 
of the brain.” In contrast, the radical biologism found in literary darwinism 
verges on the absurd unless we accept that Jane Austen’s oeuvre, as Brian Boyd 
(1–30) renders it, provides useful material for a study of preferences in human 
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A prominent example is a close collaboration between the literary critic Elaine Scarry and the 
neuropsychologist and memory expert Daniel Schacter, which has, among other things, resulted 
in the publication of Memory, Brain and Belief (2000). An interdisciplinary project between the 
linguist Gilles Fauconnier and the literary critic Mark Turner has proved likewise fruitful. One 
of their collaborative studies, The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the Mind’s Hidden 
Complexities (2002), has significantly advanced our understanding of the way human beings 
conceptualize metaphors. 
2
 Neuroscientist Antonio Damasio has done intensive research on literary emotion. His somatic 
marker theory (1994) yields illuminating insight into reception aesthetics and brings us closer to 
an explanation for “why people laugh, cry or become excited when experiencing art” (Kohn 
122). See Damasio’s Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain (New York, 
London: Penguin, 1994) and his The Feeling of What Happens (New York: Harvest, 2000).  
3 
See Joseph Carroll’s Evolution and Literary Theory, Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 
1995. 
4 
It would be a great oversight not to mention Richard Shusterman’s somaesthetics at this point. 
Indisputably, it has played a major part in bringing together the mind and the long-neglected 
body. In his 1999 formulation of somaesthetics, Shusterman maintains that “our sensory 
perception depends on how the body feels and functions, what it desires, does, and suffers” 
(301). This assumption, as Anna Budziak (2012) speculates, could provide a good starting point 
for explorations of the way an artist’s health condition or mental disorder is reflected in his/her 
style. Such explorations, for example, would allow us to explain how Ludwig van Beethoven’s 
deafness affected his later musical works or, as Budziak (2012) proposes, to investigate whether 
John Milton’s blindness had any impact on the syntax and lexis in Paradise Lost. 
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mate selection. Of these three approaches, cognitive poetics
5
 doubtless seems 
best suited to literary studies. With its interest in the “literary mind” (Turner 
1996), it explicitly refers to Ingarden’s6 work and reader response theory.7 Most 
importantly, it “applies the principles of cognitive science to the interpretation of 
literary texts” (Louwerse and van Peer 424). Consequently, in CP the discourses 
of literature become interwoven with the discourses of science and thus, as I will 
demonstrate, CP attempts to build the bridge between the sciences and the 
humanities. 
This epistemic marriage implies that even though CP does not come out of 
nowhere, its labels of “a new brand of poetics” (Gavins and Steen 5) and “a new 
science of literature and reading” (Stockwell 11) might be justified. Indeed, CP’s 
fresh perspective may result from the fact that this approach makes frequent 
forays into psychology, linguistics, artificial intelligence and neurobiology, or, in 
short, cognitive science. Rather than giving new interpretations, cognitive 
literary critics explore the ways in which we arrive at different interpretations. In 
doing so, they endeavour to find out how our minds work. Their efforts, then, 
aim at re-evaluating literature’s status by placing literature on a par with “the 
study of how the human being thinks” (Craig and Hamilton 8). Such a 
conviction, in turn, agrees with Stockwell’s slightly populist statement: the 
recognition that CP entails “the democratization of literary study” (11). In 
contrast to prescriptive post-structuralist approaches that teach us how to read 
literary texts, CP has a descriptive function. Establishing an intimate link 
between meaning and knowledge, it views literature “as a specific form of 
everyday human experience and especially cognition that is grounded in our 
general cognitive capacities for making sense of the world” (Gavins and Steen 
1). It simultaneously brings the long-neglected emotional dimension of literature 
into view by “relating the structures of the work of art […] to their presumed or 
observed psychological effects on the recipient” (Gavins and Steen 1). In other 
words, CP proposes an experientialist approach
8
 to account for both similar and 
different readings produced by readers’ minds. 
                                                     
5
 For the sake of economy, I shall refer to cognitive poetics as CP. 
6
 Unlike his New Critical colleagues, Ingarden felt it inappropriate to treat texts as autonomous 
objects. He claimed that, rather than disconnecting literature from scientific knowledge, we 
should integrate it “within a general cognitive ecology” (Tabbi 79). 
7
 In their essay “From Iser to Turner and Beyond: Reception Theory Meets Cognitive Criticism” 
(2002), Craig Hamilton and Ralf Schneider reveal intriguing affinities between reader response 
theory and cognitive criticism. Both lines of research overlap not only in their interest in the 
human mind but also in their use of “different names to talk about similar things” (11).  
8
 As Stockwell eloquently puts it, CP’s experientialist approach means that CP “offers a means of 
describing and delineating different types of knowledge and belief in a systematic way, and a 
model of how to connect these matters of circumstance and use to the language of the literature” 
(4). Rational as it may sound in theory, it seems to be hardly feasible in practice. In his CP: An 
Introduction, Stockwell never hints at how to apply an experientialist approach in text analyses. 
Instead, he unabashedly reduces the texts he takes under discussion to linguistic data, a practice 
Stockwell frequently frowns upon in his essays. 
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Interestingly, despite its refreshing perspective, CP remains a stepchild within 
the field of literary studies. The angst that the humanities may feel for this doctrine 
is, above all, caused by CP’s reliance on neuroscience and, by extension, 
empiricism, which supposedly reduces the autonomy of the humanities. To place 
too much faith in empiricism
9
 may not only slight the complexities of literary 
creativity but may also lead to obvious conclusions. Within the school of CP 
alone, there exists a rift concerning the appropriate method of research, with 
cognitive scholars opting either for empiricism (e.g. Louwerse and van Peer), 
indirect empiricism (e.g. Stockwell and Gavins) or introspection. If empiricism is 
accused of reductive bias, then the other two methods are considered selective and 
unreliable since they provide only “predictions for what readers do when they 
read” (Gavins and Steen 6). Furthermore, according to Danaher, CP “foregrounds 
the cognitive at the expense, and not in service of, the poetic” (6). Instead of 
enhancing our appreciation of literariness, it guides us through the reading jungle 
to deepen our understanding of the effects literary texts have on us. As a result, 
alongside attempting to grasp the ineffable, CP spoils the pleasure of reading. This 
undesirable side effect of CP can be illustrated by the example of Helen Keller. In 
The Story of My Life (1902), she writes that before she turned 6, she had had no 
name for ice cream and so whenever she felt like eating it, she would experience 
an immense cold feeling on her tongue. Unfortunately, upon acquiring the term ice 
cream, she lost this peculiar sensation. As an analogy, by applying CP, we run the 
risk of being deprived of an experience resulting from literariness. Finally, in his 
essay “Cognitive Poetics and Literariness: Metaphorical Analogy in Anna 
Karenina,” Danaher downplays the revolutionary character of CP. He argues that 
this doctrine “assigns cognitive labels to concepts with a long and proven tradition 
in literary criticism, without adding any significant content”10 (2). For instance, the 
basic idea of the embodied mind on which CP is built originally stems from 
Maurice Merleau-Porty’s 1940s phenomenology,11 even if it was only verified 
empirically in the 1990s. In the same vein, cognitive narratology, rather than 
marking a departure from the older paradigms, merely follows the path 
structuralist narratology paved earlier. 
The purpose of this paper is therefore to investigate the validity of such 
charges against CP, specifically by exploring to what extent cognitive science 
has influenced the field of literary studies. My research material includes Peter 
                                                     
9
 As Jeroen Vandaele and Geert Brône observe, “in some areas of literary studies there is fear of 
empiricism, with its formalization procedures and/or quantitative approaches” (22). 
10
 Much as Danaher’s observation holds true, it cannot be denied that by affixing cognitive tags to 
long-established literary terms, CP seeks to redress those terms for the purpose of developing 
analytical tools to study the workings of the human mind. In her review of CP, F. Elizabeth Hart 
makes it clear that to cognitive literary scholars, “the tools literary scholars need not merely to 
dispense with the older paradigms but actually to surpass them in their ability to teach us about 
meaning-making are most readily and sensibly found in the cognitive sciences” (226).  
11
 See Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception, transl. C. Smith, London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1962.  
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Stockwell’s seminal book Cognitive Poetics: An Introduction (2002), its 
companion publication Cognitive Poetics in Practice (2003) edited by Gavins 
and Steen, Cognitive Poetics: Goals, Gains and Gaps (2009) edited by Brône 
and Vandaele, and the essay “Music and Movement: A View from Cognitive 
Musicology” (2012) by Lawrence Zbikowski. In total, I have examined 36 
chapters and essays, all of them providing theoretical and practical discussions 
of a wide range of cognitive tools: deixis (Green 1992); prototypes (Rosch 
1975); text worlds (Werth 1999); conceptual metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson 
1980); cognitive narratology (Herman 2003); scripts (Schank and Abelson 
1977); mental spaces (Fauconnier 1994); and cognitive grammar (Langacker 
1987). Since some of the contributors in the edited sources specialize in 
cognitive psychology and cognitive linguistics (CL), it is noteworthy that the 
scope of these sources is not solely restricted to poetics. Furthermore, the 
analyzed material mostly favours indirect empiricism, placing it in stark contrast 
to the predominant empirical practice found in CL. As Fabiszak and Konat 
report (2012), out of the 206 articles published from 1999–2012 in the journal 
Cognitive Linguistics,
12
 145 were empirical studies based on either corpus data 
or experiments.  
As such, the aim of this paper is twofold. In the first instance, I want to find 
out whether the application of scientific theories has had an impact on the meta-
language in CP. Secondly, I intend to demarcate the boundaries between the 
cognitive and the poetic in selected cognitive analyses of literary texts. In my 
understanding of the term poetics, I follow Jonathan Culler and Manfred 
Bierwisch’s13 complementary views which, when combined, can be summarized 
in the following way: “poetics starts with attested meanings, effects or perceived 
regularities and asks how they are achieved” (61; 98–99). Additionally, in terms 
of the most basic classification, poetics can be divided into (a) descriptive 
poetics and (b) historical poetics. In this context, granted that poetics concerns 
the craft of literature and that cognition has to do with the mental processes 
involved in reading, the combination of these two components in CP, as 
Stockwell concludes, amounts to “a science of reading” (2).  
With reference to the first aim of this paper, I found that the statement and 
documented references in the examined articles offer convincing proof that the 
scientification of literary studies in CP is underway. In their attempts to uncover 
the workings of the reader’s mind, cognitive analysts notably borrow 
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 Remarkably, with its 21 empirical articles, the 2011 issue of Cognitive Linguistics set a record. 
Simultaneously, we can observe a sharp rise in empirical studies conducted by cognitive 
linguists (2002 and 2007 issues—3; 2010 issue—14)  
13
 Even though it specifically referred to poetry, Bierwisch’s 1970 definition of poetics, and 
especially the concluding part on poetic competence, might have prefigured Culler’s famous 
statement. Bierwisch writes, “The actual objects of poetics are the particular regularities that 
occur in literary texts and that determine the specific effects of poetry; in the final analysis—the 
human activity to produce poetic structures and understand their effect—that is, something 
which one might call poetic competence” (98–9). 
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explanatory and descriptive tools from a variety of disciplinary traditions. Their 
source material, for instance, comes from CL, pragmatics, neurophysiology, 
anthropology, computer science or neuropsychology. And these diverse, and 
conspicuously scientific influences confirm that CP is attuned to cognitive 
science. With regard to the study of literary emotion, Kohn indeed affirms that it 
was as early as the 1970s that the sciences and humanities began to join “forces 
in exploring both theoretically and empirically the source of emotion in literary 
narrative” (121). Reuven Tsur, who has been running a CP project for over 30 
years, tends to support his analyses with evidence from brain research. In his 
chapter on deixis in Cognitive Poetics in Practice, for example, he draws on 
Newberg et al.’s Single Photon Emission Computed Tomography study of 
Tibetan meditators in order to account for the way readers follow the spatio-
temporal coordinates in literary texts. In the same publication, the psychologist 
Raymond W. Gibbs Junior forcefully rejects evidence from phenomenology or 
philosophy in favour of evidence from empirical psychology. He states that 
“empirical work in cognitive psychology showed that a ‘family resemblance’ 
principle offered a better account than did the classical model for how people 
identify an instance as belonging or not to a category” (Gibbs 29). Zbikowski, on 
his part, finds justification for his claims in the neurophysiology of emotions, 
or—more specifically—in “mirror neurons” (Gallese et al. 1996). Elaborating on 
experiments on macaque monkeys, which indicate relationships between motor 
actions and cognition, Zbikowski speculates as to whether a similar mechanism 
works for the link between music and movement. Finally, Max Louwerse and 
Willie Van Peer’s article in Cognitive Poetics: Goals, Gains and Gaps 
constitutes an exceptional case in which advances in science not only set a 
theoretical basis for analytical analyses, but are directly applied to them. These 
scholars employ a computational model called Latent Semantic Analysis to 
argue that the understanding of literary language can be explained not only 
through embodied analyses conducted by most cognitive poeticians, but also 
with recourse to a symbolic approach. 
CP’s strong reliance on cognitive science is beyond doubt. Its subordinate 
position, however, is mainly due to the fact that, as Joseph Tabbi eloquently puts 
it, “literature needs to wait on confirmations from science” (80). Furthermore, 
some of its originators, like Mark Turner, tend to shift their attention from 
literature to mechanisms of thought and thus become cognitive scientists. But let 
us now examine this scientifically inclined doctrine in terms of the ratio between 
the cognitive and the poetic. Does CP strengthen or dampen our perception of a 
text’s literariness? Does it constitute, as Stockwell argues, a science of reading 
or rather a science of cognition? First of all, a glance at any of the 36 selected 
articles reveals that their authors reduce historical poetics to a minimum. In most 
of these essays this aspect is strikingly absent. Only Stockwell, Gavins and 
Semino make an effort to place the texts they analyze in their historical contexts. 
Take, for instance, Semino’s text-world analysis of Carol Ann Duffy’s poem 
“Mrs. Midas,” which is preceded by a biography of the writer and a remark 
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about her feminist affiliation. Another notable observation is that, even though 
the examined articles widely employ key issues of literary reading—such as 
tone, literariness, character, narrative, metaphor or plot—and they seem to do it 
as a pretext for affixing cognitive labels to those concepts and engaging in 
lengthy cognitive deliberations. In short, the poetic merely serves as a starting 
point for the cognitive. To substantiate this conclusion, let me give you a few 
selected examples: in CP, (1) “the use of the word wife [in Sir Henry Wotton’s 
poem “Upon the Death of Sir Albert Morton’s Wife”] activates the marriage 
scenario as a specific variant of the love scenario” (Steen 74); (2) “narrative 
perspective […] can be interpreted as a reflex of the mind or minds 
conceptualizing scenes represented in narrative texts” (Herman 99); (3) “the 
world of a literary text consists of one or more deictic fields, which are 
composed of a whole range of expressions each of which can be categorized as 
perceptual, spatial, temporal, textual and compositional in nature” (Stockwell 
47); (4) metaphors in “The Dream of the Rood” do not account for “a simple re-
telling of the passion of Christ, but a schema reinforcement
14
 by simple 
repetition” (Stockwell 85). These examples show that, rather than focusing on a 
text’s literariness, CP analyses predominantly concentrate on a text’s potential 
utility for cognitive models. Still, there are exceptions to this rule. It may be 
convincingly argued that Semino’s possible-worlds analysis and Gavins’s text-
worlds analysis indeed highlight the text’s literariness by illustrating its detailed 
internal structure and its ideal graphic representation as visualized by the reader. 
Towards achieving the second aim of my present paper, I began with a test 
that slightly modifies Danaher’s observation that CP “foregrounds the cognitive 
at the expense of, and not in service of, the poetic” (6). In order to place the 
emphasis on the role of the poetic, I would say that: in CP, the poetic is in 
service of the cognitive, not the other way round. CP foregrounds the cognitive 
not only through the content oriented towards explaining the workings of the 
mind, but also, as I propose, through its meta-language. Predicated on complex 
analytical machinery, CP in a way exemplifies a return to the hermetic discourse 
of structuralism. It enforces its scientific meta-language both (a) on a purely 
verbal level and (b) by means of visual aids in the form of diagrams, tables and 
graphs. The verbal component is comprised of borrowings, mostly from 
linguistics and computer science. Consider, for example, Turner’s famous 
concepts of “blending,” “mapping” and “projecting,” all in circulation now. 
These terms encapsulate the ways we understand and process conceptual 
metaphors such as MELANCHOLY IS THE END OF THE WORLD, by mapping onto 
each other propositions taken from (a) the source domain of THE END OF THE 
WORLD and (b) the target domain of MELANCHOLY. Stockwell, for instance, 
chooses to resort to computer science. In his chapter on deixis, he introduces the 
term “edgework” to refer to the process of identifying the boundaries of deictic 
fields, and the terms “push” and “pop” (49) to describe deictic shifts. Some of 
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the sentences in this chapter are almost incomprehensible, especially when taken 
out of context, for example: “Characters can also be kept ‘live’ by conjoining co-
ordinate clauses to maintain co-reference to the character, by subject-chaining 
(using pronouns to keep the current entity-role live)” (54). In discussing how we 
scan cognitive input in his chapter on cognitive grammar, Stockwell distinguishes 
between “summary scanning” and “sequential scanning” (64). While “summary 
scanning” typically occurs when nominals are processed (“Look at the sun”; “It’s 
a sunny day”), “sequential scanning” takes place in the case of dynamic actions 
(“The sun crossed the sky in a blaze of light”). In Giora et al.’s article entitled 
“Does an ‘Ironic Situation’ Favor an Ironic Interpretation?”, we find yet another 
example of what may happen if dry empiricism is applied in literary studies. In 
this case it leads to mathematics:  
The difference between the two was significant, t(14)=15.34, p<.0001). 
They demonstrate that there was no difference in the mean reading 
time of ironic targets following either a context featuring a frustrated 
expectation (1927 msec, SD=421) or a context featuring a realized 
expectation (1906 msec, SD=453), t1(53)<1, n.s., t2(14)<1, n.s. (Giora 
et al. 392) 
Moreover, the complex and convoluted language in CP becomes even less 
palatable when used in analyses restricted to poems or short extracts—a 
preferred practice in CP which is, however, regarded as one of its weaknesses. 
As Semino notes, text-world diagrams “become impossibly complicated when 
applied to stretches of text longer than a few sentences” (59). Indeed, in CP, 
literary masterpieces are often reduced to static diagrams and building blocks, 
intricate graphs and tables full of mathematical jibber-jabber. CP, then, 
represents an attempt to apply logic in breaking down literature into its 
components. To use cognitive terms, COGNITIVE POETICS IS A LINGUISTIC 
DISSECTION OF LITERATURE. 
In conclusion, CP (a) borrows considerably from the cognitive sciences, (b) 
uses literature as a tool to explore how the human mind works and (c) utilizes its 
own meta-language. But one important question still remains, namely: what is 
the future of CP within the field of literary studies? In this regard it is in the first 
instance advisable to find an alternative for the name ‘CP’, since it gives the 
false impression that the discipline’s main focus falls on poetics. One such 
alternative would be “Cognitive Criticism” (CC), which could indeed function as 
an umbrella term that also embraces related disciplines. In contrast to 
Stockwell’s “science of reading,” CC would be a science of art reception, which 
would emphasize its already wide scope of application. It is important, however, 
that CC should not neglect its roots in reception theory and should therefore 
adopt a truly empirical approach. But what I have in mind is not the stricter 
forms of empiricism preferred by Louwerse and Van Peer, but rather the “soft” 
empiricism favoured by Norman Holland and David S. Miall. Finally, in its 
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disciplinary outlook, CC could primarily be geared towards its two main 
concerns: aesthetics and pedagogy. The latter has already been undertaken in 
combination with highly promising lines of inquiry into literary emotion. But, 
despite the fact that CC has enormous potential for application in education, the 
former has so far not been initiated. With the help of CC in a simplified and 
accessible version, students and pupils could, for example, learn about their 
cognitive experience and thus enhance their awareness as readers. Such an 
educational project seems especially relevant in the context of Nicholas Carr’s 
discovery in his phenomenally popular book The Shallows: What the Internet is 
Doing to Our Brains? (2011): the prediction that the Internet will not only rewire 
our brain, but, more unsettlingly, that it will shallow the human mind so much as 
to strip it of the ability to derive sheer aesthetic pleasure from literature and art. 
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On the Semantics of the English Resultative Present 
Perfect 
Csaba Czeglédi 
The paper discusses some issues and misunderstandings in the 
interpretation of what Huddleston and Pullum (2002) call ‘the 
resultative perfect’. It is shown, in particular, how and when Leech 
(1971) was right about the meaning of the English present perfect, 
when he thought he wasn’t (and how he wasn’t when he thought he 
was). 
Key words: aspect, implicature, indefinite past event, people’s 
mental models of the world and of other minds, resultative perfect 
1 Introduction 
This paper is concerned with the interpretation of sentences like 
(1)  She has broken her leg. (Huddleston and Pullum 2002:145) 
We shall be interested in how what is often called the ‘resultative meaning’ 
associated with sentences like (1) is expressed and understood. The aspects of 
the grammatical structure of (1) that interest us now will be informally called 
‘the present perfect’, following more or less generally accepted practice in the 
description of English. One of several different specific questions that arise in 
this connection is how much of the resultative meaning attributed to sentences 
like (1) is a matter of their grammatical structure. Another is this: If not all of it, 
where does the rest come from? Perhaps it is not premature at this point to 
informally indicate two of the general conclusions of this short essay. We will 
see, on the one hand, that very little of the resultative meaning of sentences in 
the present perfect is a matter of their grammar, contrary to what is almost 
universally claimed and accepted. In fact, in an important sense, none of the 
resultative meaning of sentences like (1) is a matter of grammar. Second, in 
answer to the second specific question informally formulated above, we shall 
conclude that most, perhaps all, of the resultative meaning of such sentences is 
the contribution of an interaction between partly cognitive and partly 
communicative principles, which lie beyond the domain of grammar, 
conventionally understood. We will see how the interpretation of sentences like 
(1) involves domains of knowledge in speakers’ and hearers’ minds beyond their 
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knowledge of language. Perhaps surprisingly, and contrary to the almost 
universally held belief, that will lead to the conclusion that little, if any, of the 
‘resultative meaning of the present perfect’ is linguistic meaning at all, in the 
narrow and now conventional sense of the term linguistic. 
2 The “Resultative Perfect” 
In one form or another, all authoritative descriptive grammars of English 
recognize what is sometimes called the “resultative perfect” as a variant or use 
of the present perfect. As Huddleston and Pullum (2002:143) observe, 
“grammars commonly distinguish four major uses of the present perfect: the 
continuative, the experiential (or ‘existential’) perfect, the resultative perfect, 
and the perfect of recent past… [which] can be thought of as a classification of 
the main ways in which the concept of a time-span up to now can be involved in 
the use and interpretation of the present perfect—or as different ways in which 
the past situation may have ‘current relevance’.” 
(1) above is claimed to be one of “the clearest cases of the resultative 
perfect…, where the situation is one that inherently involves a change of state: 
breaking a leg yields a resultant state where the leg is broken” (Huddleston and 
Pullum 2002:143). As Huddleston and Pullum (ibid.) note “the connection with 
the present in this resultative use is that the resultant state still obtains now.” 
Now, what does it mean to claim or assume that there is such a thing as the 
resultative (present) perfect in English? Or, what does it mean to say that (1) is a 
particularly clear case of the resultative (present) perfect, which describes a past 
situation with current relevance, where the “current relevance” is the present 
result of the past event, which “still obtains now”? Notice that the descriptive 
statements of the sort just quoted carry an important contrastive implication, 
without which they are entirely uninteresting. This contrastive implication, 
which is just as simple as it is important, is that the descriptive statements in 
question identify specific distinctive properties of the (resultative) present 
perfect. If they did not, they would not only be without any interest at all but 
they would be misleading. For example, if the claim that the (resultative) present 
perfect expresses the “current relevance” or present result of a past event is 
meant without the implication that this is something specific and distinctive 
about the present perfect, meaning that it does not apply to any other type of 
report of a past event, such as a sentence in the past tense, for instance, then it 
would be no more interesting than, say, pointing out about rodents that they have 
four legs, which is an exceptionally banal statement, as it is one of several non-
distinctive predictable properties they share with all other terrestrial mammals. 
Therefore, to introduce the ‘resultative perfect’ as a subcategory in English 
grammar must imply denying that there is such a thing as ‘the resultative past’, 
for instance, not only for it to be minimally interesting but also in order that the 
grammar and use of English is not given a misleading representation. 
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Having clarified the conceptually and logically necessary contrastive 
implications of the notion of the ‘resultative perfect’, let us move on to another 
logical consequence of the foregoing, which is in part an empirical matter, 
therefore crucial in the description of English. This is a very simple point—the 
implication just discussed has to be correct. If it is not, the notion of the 
‘resultative perfect’, in the conventional sense, becomes practically meaningless 
and all accompanying claims are not only misleading but quite simply wrong. As 
just noted, for it to be interesting, meaningful, and correct, the notion of the 
‘resultative perfect’ must imply the denial of the existence of the ‘resultative 
past’. What this means is that we should be unable to construct (or find) an 
English sentence which describes a past event in the past tense, where the event 
or situation described has ‘current relevance’ in the form of a resultant state 
which “still obtains now.” Fatally for the notion of the ‘resultative perfect’ and 
all accompanying claims, it is not at all difficult to find or construct such an 
English sentence. Indeed, there are an infinite number of them. Consider, for 
example, (2) below. 
(2)  She broke her leg yesterday. 
What does (2) mean? How does it compare with the meaning of (1)? When we 
answer these questions, have we also answered the question about what a 
speaker of English understands when they hear or read (1) or (2)? These are not 
easy questions at all. It may not seem straightforward, for instance, that the best 
answer to the latter is very likely in the negative, as we shall see later. It is 
sometimes easier to say what a sentence does not mean. Take (1), for instance. 
As Huddleston and Pullum (2002:145) observe, “She has broken her leg does 
not mean “Her leg is broken”, but this is the likely implicature.” That is correct, 
indeed, (1) does not directly say anything about the condition of “her leg” at the 
time the event is reported. Instead, (1) merely reports a past event. That is what 
it “means.” If there is anything else a speaker-hearer understands in addition to 
the concept of the past event reported, that must come from a different source, as 
it is not, strictly speaking, part of the meaning of the sentence. The sentence is 
not a statement about the present state of “her leg” but a statement about what 
has happened. If, upon hearing or reading (1), a speaker-hearer can construct 
thoughts not only about the past state of the world but also about the present 
state of “her leg,” they must make use of knowledge beyond and different from 
their knowledge of grammar. Immediately, serious questions arise about what 
that knowledge is and how it is used in constructing thoughts about “the present 
state of the world,” including the state of “her leg,” and questions about how that 
domain of knowledge interacts with a speaker’s knowledge of grammar. We 
shall address some of these questions later. 
To return to the meaning of (1) and (2) and the “likely implicature” they 
somehow involve, it is clear that the implicature ‘Her leg is broken’ is identical 
in both. It may be less clear how that implicature is mentally constructed by 
speakers of English and how the meaning of (1) or (2) contributes to that 
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process, questions to which we shall return directly. But it should be obvious 
now, as a matter of logical consequence, that the conventional notion of the 
‘resultative (present) perfect’ is incoherent and that any claim about the meaning 
or interpretation of sentences like (1) formulated in terms of that notion is 
untenable (or utterly insipid). Nevertheless, as noted above, all major 
descriptions of English, including Huddleston and Pullum (2002), make such 
claims about what is sometimes called the “resultative use” of the present perfect 
(ibid., p. 143). These claims about the present perfect or its use are made in a 
variety of different styles and they sometimes vary in strength, but their core 
content, formulated in (3) below, is more or less identical. Call it the Resultative 
(Present) Perfect Rule (RPR). 
(3)  Resultative Perfect Rule (RPR) 
The resultative present perfect expresses the present result of a past 
event. 
Some aspects of the ambiguity of such a rule or claim have already been 
exposed above. Let us clarify that ambiguity in more explicit terms now in order 
to see first, how and why RPR is hopelessly equivocal and second, how it is 
simply wrong on the most interesting, perhaps generally intended, reading. 
As any similar rule formulated in informal natural language terms, RPR 
may be assigned either a conditional or a biconditional reading. In fact, RPR 
corresponds to two different conditional readings and a third, biconditional 
reading. These may be spelled out as in (4a-c) below. 
(4) a.  x P(x)  R(x) — conditional, correct (but not very interesting) 
 b.  x R(x)  P(x) — conditional, wrong (cf. (2)) 
 c.  x P(x)  R(x) — biconditional = ‘(4a) & (4b)’, wrong (cf. (2)) 
Where P = ‘Present Perfect’, R = ‘present Result’, and x is a variable over 
sentences which report a past event. 
In English translation, (4a) could be paraphrased as something like this: For 
any English sentence, if it is in the present perfect (and if it contains the “right 
sort of verb,” a condition to which we shall return below), it will express the 
present result of the past event that is reported in it. (1) above is such an English 
sentence. Notice that (4a) says nothing about the interpretation of any other type 
of sentence which reports a past event, such as, for example, a sentence like (2) 
in the past tense. Therefore, on this reading, RPR would not be a terribly 
exciting rule of English, as it would be unable to distinguish between the 
meaning of (1) and the meaning of (2). Indeed, it is rarely assigned such a flimsy 
and uninspiring interpretation in grammars. But it sometimes is, as in 
Greenbaum and Quirk (1990:52), where it is said that “the use of the present 
perfect for recent events may imply that the result of the event still applies” 
(emphasis mine). This is a rare example of a completely vacuous rule. It does 
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not mean anything at all, since to say that something “may” be the case implies 
saying that it may or may not be the case, and that much is 100% predictable 
about any aspect of the meaning of any sentence. 
(4b) is a more interesting alternative reading that can be assigned to RPR. 
RPR on this reading means that the present result of a past event can only be 
expressed in a sentence which reports that past event in the present perfect. As 
(2) above shows, this is not true. On the last possible reading, (4c), RPR is read 
as a logical biconditional, meaning that an English sentence which reports a past 
event is understood as implying that its present result still obtains if and only if 
that sentence is in the present perfect. This precludes that any such sentence in 
the past tense have such an implication. Again, as (2) testifies, that is not correct. 
To summarize, RPR is correct only on a pedestrian and practically meaningless 
reading, and it is wrong on both remaining alternative interpretations, of which 
the biconditional reading is clearly of most interest and, perhaps, the one that is 
generally intended, but flawed, in descriptions of English. 
3 Predicates that allow a resultative reading 
Let us return now to a condition noted above, which is rarely made clear in 
connection with the resultative interpretation of sentences that report a past 
event—either in the present perfect, as in (1), or in the past tense, as in (2). The 
condition in question has to do with the predicate of such reports and the type of 
event reported. As Quirk et al. (1985:193) note, “the… connotation, that the 
result of the action still obtains, applies to dynamic conclusive verbs…, ie verbs 
whose meaning implies the accomplishment of a change of state.” What Quirk et 
al. call dynamic conclusive verbs are otherwise known as predicates denoting 
accomplishments, such as e.g. dismantle, run a mile, walk to school, paint a 
picture, grow up, etc., and achievements, such as e.g. arrive, recognize, find, win, 
stop, start, resume, be born, or break a leg, etc., in Vendler’s (1967) typology of 
events. These two subcategories of events share some important properties—they 
inherently bring about a change of state, which is their ‘result’, when the event is 
completed, reaching its culmination point (cf. Kiefer 1994, 2009, Vendler 1967). 
Note that accomplishments and achievements are not categories of language 
but subcategories of eventualities in speakers’ models of the world. This implies 
that speakers do construct models of the world, which include theories of events, 
among other things, perhaps very much like Vendler’s (1967), a reasonable 
assumption. A speaker with a theory of eventualities will understand that every 
time an accomplishment or achievement, such as someone breaking a leg, occurs 
and is completed, reaching its culmination point, the world will have changed as 
a consequence of the completion of the event. In our example, there will be a 
broken leg. To know such things is not a matter of speakers’ knowledge of 
English syntax but a matter of what we know about the bones in our legs and 
other parts of the body, how such bony parts break when they do, etc. Such 
elements of knowledge can then feed our innate logical faculty which allows us 
56 Csaba Czeglédi 
to draw all sorts of inferences from them, none of which is a matter of language 
or syntax either (cf. Crain and Khlentzos 2008).  
Grammar cannot express such things as the present result of a past event. 
Whenever such “elements of meaning” are understood, they are inferred in part 
from what we know about the world and in part from ideas conveyed by a 
sentence, such as the idea of a completed event, a matter of syntax, more 
specifically, a matter of aspect. The latter is indeed a matter of language. But 
whatever we know about our legs and the bones in them is not. In English, for 
instance, a sentence is always marked for its aspect. The two examples above, 
(1) and (2), are both perfective, which means that the events they report are 
described as completed. Therefore, not surprisingly, both imply that the resultant 
state, ‘Her leg is broken’, brought about by the completion of the achievement 
reported obtains following the completion of the events. How such resultant 
states are or are not interpreted as ‘relevant to the present’ is a more complex 
matter. We turn to that directly. 
4 Understanding reports of past events 
How speakers of a language intend and understand reports of past events is as 
much, or more, a matter of principles of cognition and communication as it is a 
matter of knowledge of language. As pointed out above, understanding the 
‘present relevance’ of the result of a past event is not a matter of syntax at all. 
None of that is surprising. Indeed, it would be surprising if the division of labor 
among cognitive faculties in the human mind were different. It would indeed be 
surprising, for example, to find that such notions as the ‘result of a past event’ or 
its ‘present relevance’ were somehow coded in the grammar of a language. If 
this were the case, we would expect that it may be coded in different ways in 
different languages, or that it is perhaps not coded at all in the language of some 
community and therefore members of that community cannot communicate such 
ideas, or that the English present perfect is the realization of some language 
universal designed for the expression of that notion, with counterparts to be 
found in all languages. None of that seems to be true. In fact, you do not need to 
talk about past events at all in order to understand how some of them may or 
may not have brought about changes in the world, some of which are perhaps 
relevant to the present. You do not even need any language to understand such 
matters. Many animals appear to know such things without any language or the 
ability to communicate with one another verbally. 
It is much more plausible to assume that a speaker’s knowledge of language 
interacts with other language-independent cognitive domains in the computation 
of such complex ideas as the ‘present relevance of a past event’. Two such 
domains stand out as particularly relevant for the understanding of the notions 
we are discussing, in addition to a person’s knowledge of language—their model 
of the world and their (largely) implicit knowledge of the principles of 
communication. 
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Assume, then, that a speaker (S) reports (1) to a hearer (H). Both S and H 
possess a model of the world (SM and HM, respectively), which includes a 
theory of events along the lines of Vendler (1967). This much, or this little, 
immediately accounts for how both S and H understand the resulting state (RS) 
brought about by the past event reported in (1), or in (2), for that matter, as 
discussed above. 
What remains to be explained is how sentences like (1), or (2), may be 
specifically intended by S to get H to understand RS and to get H to understand 
that that is S’s specific intention or communicative goal. In order to account for 
this, we need to assume that S and H construct what Givón (2005:7) calls 
“mental models of other minds” and that such models are constantly updated, 
meaning that S and H regularly update their mutual assumptions about what the 
other knows (ibid., p. 104). Given S’s model of HM, he expects H to infer RS 
brought about by the event reported in (1) or (2). Given H’s model of SM, he too 
assumes that S would be justified in expecting H to infer RS. Given these 
conditions, H would be justified in inferring that that is indeed S’s expectation or 
intention, i.e., for H to infer RS. 
Given that both (1) and (2) report a past achievement that brings about a 
resultant state, the scenario sketched so far works for both. But (1) and (2) are 
slightly different. An important difference between them is that (1) reports an 
event as “news out of the blue,” which is not necessarily the case in (2), though 
possible. To put it in terms of the system of assumptions sketched above, (1) is 
natural only if S assumes that HM does not contain a representation of the event 
reported in (1) prior to S actually saying (1) to H. In other words, for (1) to be 
natural, S must assume that, before it is actually reported, H cannot identify the 
representation of the event described in (1), as it is simply not there in HM. 
(2) is slightly different. Whereas (1) is natural only under the conditions just 
discussed, (2) is natural in either of two different scenarios. One is very similar 
to the conditions just sketched for (1), modulo the contribution of the adverb 
yesterday to HM. The other is radically different from the conditions under 
which (1) is natural in that in this alternative scenario S assumes prior to his 
report about the past event that its representation is already there in HM. Once it 
is there, it can be identified as specific or unique, provided that the information 
about the event that is necessary for its identification is already available in HM 
or else it is supplied. This is precisely the alternative natural communicative goal 
S may specifically intend to achieve in (2)—supply H with that information, the 
time of the event reported. 
All this is easy to misunderstand. It is indeed generally misunderstood as a 
choice determined by whether the time of a past event is or is not known. That is 
a serious misunderstanding on at least two different levels. First, note that it is 
pointless to talk about the knowledge of the time of a past event without 
specifying whose knowledge is meant. If it is S’s knowledge, as is generally 
tacitly assumed, it is irrelevant. Regardless of what S knows about the event 
reported in (1) or (2), (1) is always a possible choice, even if S knows exactly 
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when the event occurred. What decides the choice between (1) and (2) is not 
what S knows about the event but what S assumes H knows about it. If this 
reminds some readers of the choice or contrast between definite and indefinite 
noun phrases, that is no coincidence. The choice or contrast between (1) and (2) 
is essentially of the same nature, as noted early by Leech (1971).  
He very clearly points out that “with ‘event verbs’, the Present Perfect may 
refer to some indefinite happening in the past: …All my family have had 
measles” (Leech 1971:32, bold mine), where indefinite can be understood in the 
regular sense, meaning that S assumes that the event is not identifiable as 
specific or unique in HM. 
Leech adds, “At first glance, it looks as if there is no element of ‘present 
involvement’ in this use of the Present Perfect, any more than there is in the 
Simple Past. But in fact, a more precise definition of the indefinite past use 
must indicate that a period of time leading up to the present is involved here… 
the ‘indefinite past’ definition must be revised, and more exactly formulated as 
‘at-least-once-in-a-period-up-to-the-present’. This longer wording… adds nothing 
material to the more concise label ‘indefinite past’” (Leech 1971:32, emphases 
mine). 
He is absolutely right about the first point. Take our examples, (1) and (2). 
Indeed, the resultant state brought about by the event reported in them is no 
more relevant to the present in (1) than it is in (2). His second remark about “the 
indefinite past”, however, is a misunderstanding. What is decisive here is not the 
indefiniteness of “the past” or of some past time but the indefiniteness of the 
event, which turns on S’s assumptions about its identifiability in HM. His final, 
somewhat self-critical remark is justified. The “longer wording” of “a-period-
up-to-the-present” adds nothing of interest, as such a period is simply called 
“past.” 
5 Some concluding remarks 
Steven Pinker’s book on “The Language Instinct” opens thus: “I have never met 
a person who is not interested in language. I wrote this book to try to satisfy that 
curiosity” (Pinker 1994:7). The grammatical structure of neither of these two 
opening statements is surprising or unnatural. The present perfect in the first is 
not unexpected. But the past tense in the second ought to be if the standard 
claims about the resultative perfect were right, on the only interesting implicitly 
contrastive reading which implies denying the existence of the “resultative past.” 
Aside from citations like the present one, which are completely irrelevant for 
obvious reasons, the only way anyone can read the statements just quoted is by 
reading Pinker’s book in which they were printed, the result of the action 
reported in the second statement in the past tense. Note, in addition, that the time 
of writing or completing the book is not specified, nor does it matter at all from 
the reader’s perspective. These properties of the meaning associated with the 
second statement under discussion combined with RPR would dictate that the 
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sentence ought to be formulated in the present perfect. That it is not shows that 
RPR is flawed. Notice, however, that the structure of both sentences is consistent 
with what Leech (1971) suggested early on—the “resultative” present perfect 
occurs in the description of indefinite past events. Any other aspect of meaning 
that users of English understand, including the ‘present relevance’ of some 
resultant state, is a matter of “pragmatic inference,” which involves interaction 
between linguistic and non-linguistic cognitive domains in the human mind, 
including speaker-hearers’ mental models of the world and of “other minds.” 
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Semantic profiles of dark and blak in The 
Canterbury Tales 
Agnieszka Wawrzyniak 
The aim of the present paper is to analyse the semantic profiles of 
black and dark in The Canterbury Tales. The analysis will 
approach in detail the literal and metaphorical senses instantiated 
by the two words. The study will aim to point to the semantic 
differences existing between them. To begin with, the paper will 
account for the differences on the literal plane between ME blak 
and dark, which affected the nature of the metaphorical senses 
developed by the two words. On the metaphorical plane, blak will 
be shown to be a word that did not develop abstract, evaluative 
senses that could be projected via a mapping of the concrete onto a 
more abstract layer of conceptualisation. In other words, the study 
will emphasise that the metaphorical senses of blak were just 
symbolic associations of a colour rather than abstract senses 
separated from the concept of a colour. As for dark, the paper will 
reflect on its semantic flexibility on the metaphorical plane and will 
attempt to provide a hypothesis for why it happened so. 
Key words: epistemic, conceptualisation, association, binary, 
symbolism. 
1. Introduction 
The present paper offers semantic profiles of the central and metaphorical senses 
projected by dark and blak in The Canterbury Tales. It should be emphasised that 
scarcely any linguistic research has been devoted to the study of the concepts of 
‘black’ and ‘dark’. The concept of ‘dark’ has been often analysed together with 
‘light’ (Kövecses 2002; Lakoff and Johnson 1980). As for the cognitive analyses 
of colours, works by Barley (1974), Biggam (1997) and Mac Laury (1992) to 
mention but a few, have contributed to the conceptualisation of colours not as 
fixed categories but as constantly changing ones, and contingent on culture and a 
system of beliefs. The aims of the present paper are the following: 
To begin with, the study will focus on the existing differences between the 
two apparently related words on both the literal and metaphorical planes. On the 
literal plane, the paper will show what blak and dark actually meant and what 
shades they stood for in the medieval period. Moreover, the analysis will 
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investigate whether blak and dark were equally correlated with the concept of a 
colour. In other words, the analysis will aim to show whether the concept of a 
colour constituted a primary or a secondary association in the conceptual 
framework of the two lexemes. Furthermore, the paper will also draw upon the 
symbolic and cultural associations evoked by the two lexemes. On the 
metaphorical plane, blak and dark will be illustrated as source domains used to 
conceptualise target domains of an abstract nature. Additionally, the analysis 
will also attempt to show which of the two lexemes developed more 
metaphorical senses.  
Secondly, the emergence of new abstract senses can be analysed in parallel 
with the tendencies of unidirectionality (Traugott 1989), according to which 
change always proceeds from the objective to the subjective proposition. Thus, 
the initial, concrete meaning from the real–world domain becomes the basis for 
the emergence of the epistemic, abstract, logical sense, which focuses on the 
internal world of the speaker’s belief state. The study will illustrate that the 
semantic paths of blak and dark did not overlap to the same extent with the 
development of the abstract senses reflected in the tendencies of 
unidirectionality. In other words, the paper will point to the lexeme which, in the 
metaphorical context, preserved the link with the initial, root sense, as well as to 
the one which severed the link with the early basic sense. 
The analysis utilises Caxton’s The Canterbury Tales: The British Library 
Copies (ed. by Barbara Bordalejo), which is a CD-ROM containing the first full-
colour facsimiles of all copies of William Caxton’s first and second editions of 
Geoffrey Chaucer’s The Canterbury Tales. The semantic analysis focuses on all 
the contexts and phrases in which the two words were recorded, and views them 
from a cognitive perspective.  
2. The analysis of dark  
Dark (CEDEL, sv. dark) originated from PGmc derkaz, ‘to hide, conceal’. 
According to the Middle English Dictionary (MED, sv. dark), dark contained the 
following senses in the Middle English period: 
 
1) 
a) of a room, the underworld, the grave etc: lacking illumination: dark, 
dusky, dismal 
b) of the atmosphere, the weather, etc; dark (night), lowering, threatening 
(clouds, weather) 
c) of a luminous body: dim, obscured, and inconspicuous 
d) of various things: lacking brightness; dark, dull, murky 
 
2)  
a) of a colour; not bright, dull, dark 
b) of the skin or complexion: pallid, wan 
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3)  
a) obscure or unclear (statement, word) 
b) hard to understand, mysterious 
c) unaware, unperceptive, ignorant, unenlightened 
 
4) intentionally obscure, deceptive, malicious 
 
One can view these stages as a path to the development of greater subjectivity. 
The senses covering stages 1 and 2 are literal or less metaphorical. The concept 
of a colour is central in their conceptual framework. The senses in stages 3 and 4 
encode an increase in the level of abstractness and subjectivity. They are more 
personal and the link with the literal darkness is either barely noticeable or 
bleached from their conceptual framework. 
2.1 Literal and less metaphorical senses of dark 
According to the corpus, when related to literal and less metaphorical contexts, 
dark was recorded in the following contexts: 
 
Places 
(1) Myn is the prison in the derk cote (The Knight’s Tale 1599). 
(Mine is the prison in the dark cell). 
 
(2) And nyste neuer where she was for it was derk (The Reeve’s Tale 305). 
(And she never knew where she was for it was dark). 
 
Dark renders the attribute of a place, which is dismal, dusky and lacks 
illumination. Dark, then, applies to places, in which there is no light.  
 
Hell 
The other place projected by the source domain of darkness was Hell. When 
describing Hell, dark was more metaphorical than dark when it pertained to 
other places. It did not describe a place that is merely devoid of light, but 
primarily implied religious undertones, and hence an atmosphere of sin and 
depravity. The literal absence of light was a starting point for further 
associations with Hell, such as misery, evil or torture. 
Darkness that projected the concept of Hell can be exemplified by the 
following contexts: 
 
(3) But in helle her sight shal be ful of derkness of smoke and ful of teris 
(The Parson’s Tale 134). 
(But in Hell her sight will be full of darkness of smoke and full of tears) 
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(4) All the horrible devylles that hem tormente coverd with the derknes of 
deth 
That ben the synnes that the wrecched man hath don. (The Parson’s Tale 
109–111) 
(All the horrible devils that torment him covered with the darkness of 
death that is the sins that the wretched man had done). 
 
In (3), the domain of ‘darkness’ is used to structure the target domain of misery. 
On the literal plane, ‘darkness’ is illustrated as an attribute which precludes 
vision. The eyes full of tears and the dark smoke around are factors which make 
it hardly possible for the man to see. Yet, connected with Hell, ‘darkness’ also 
evokes further metaphorical associations. First and foremost, ‘darkness’ creates 
an atmosphere of sin and depravity; hence a consequence of life in sin without 
life and God. ‘Darkness’ becomes the reflection of the sins committed by 
humans. Juxtaposed with tears, it evokes a state of melancholy, anguish and 
grief. ‘Darkness’ is then often experienced in Hell, and is thus linked with 
annihilation and torture. In (4), it corresponds to a lack of life, and thus to death. 
Moreover, dark could also function as part of descriptive phrases that refer 
to Hell indirectly, as in (5, 6): 
 
(5) I may go retornyng to the derk erthe and coveryd with derknes, the 
land of  
Miserye and of derknes where ther is shadow of deth wher ther is non 
other ordenance but grisly drede that shal euer laste. (The Parson’s Tale 
102–103) 
(I may go and return to the dark earth covered with darkness, the 
land of misery and of darkness where there is shadow of death where 
there is no other order but terrible dread that shall ever last). 
 
(6) And for that faith is ded withoute werkis 
So forto werkyn yeue me witte and space 
That I be quyt from thens that most derk is. (The Second Nun’s 
Prologue 64–67) 
(And as faith is dead without deeds 
So for to work give me wit and space 
So that I will be set free from the place that most dark is). 
 
It should be emphasised that in medieval times, Hell was a taboo subject. 
Consequently, people avoided talking about Hell openly and used neutral, 
indirect descriptive phrases instead, namely, the metaphorical expressions 
containing the adjective dark, such as dark earth, or dark place (Wawrzyniak 
2012). A closer look at the indirect expressions suggests that in medieval times 
(covering the time-span recorded in The Canterbury Tales) Hell was considered 
as taboo and that it may have evoked fear and a feeling of uncertainty. People, 
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therefore, may have believed that by articulating this word aloud, they would 
attract evil powers and draw the attention of the adversary. Therefore, they 
preferred to refer to Hell in a roundabout way rather than directly. The recorded 
circuitous, indirect phrases, like dark place or dark earth performed, thus, the 
role of euphemisms; hence they were substitutions for an expression that might 
have been regarded as offensive to the receiver. They were conventional 
expressions used on an everyday basis. Though they initially sounded 
metaphorical, the phrases gradually lost their metaphorical status and became 
conventionalised, deeply entrenched in the speakers’ conceptual system. In other 
words, they started to be perceived as ordinary expressions. Such was the 
perception of the phrases dark earth or dark place, which did not sound odd to 
speakers of Medieval English and constituted a set of agreeable and less 
offensive expressions related to religious concepts.  
Moreover, the expression dark earth can be considered as a semi-metaphor 
based on metonymy rather than as a pure metaphor. The metonymic basis that 
constitutes the basis for the metaphorisation is one attribute of Hell, hence the 
part (‘darkness’ or ‘lack of light’) that stands for the whole, hence for the entire 
concept associated with Hell. The semi-metaphor, or the half metaphor can be 
explained on the grounds that the link with literal ‘darkness’, that is, with the 
lack of light, is still preserved. 
 
Atmosphere, weather 
Dark pertaining to weather was recorded in the following contexts: 
  
(7) Derk was the nyght as piche or cool (The Miller’s Tale 543). 
(Dark was the night as pitch or coal). 
 
(8) Night is dark and rude (The Merchant’s Tale 554). 
(Night is dark and rude). 
 
(9) A derk cloude between vs and the sonne (The Parson’s Tale 111). 
(A dark cloud between us and the Sun). 
 
When referring to the atmosphere or weather, dark could be a descriptive 
element highlighting a lack of light (7). Additionally, it could imply threatening 
undertones (8), as it describes a place that is literally dark and thereby creates an 
atmosphere of danger and unpredictability. Moreover, dark could be a purely 
figurative element (9). The expression a derk cloude ‘a dark cloud’, is a 
metaphor that refers to sins committed by humans. Those sins ‘give rise to a 
cloud’ that makes it almost impossible for humanity to see the light.  
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2.2 Metaphorical senses projected by dark 
Evil deeds, actions 
‘Darkness’ could also denote evil, perceived in terms of evil deeds or 
actions, which can be exemplified by the context: 
 
(10) Now cristis owen knyghtis leef and deer 
Cast al awey the workis of derknesse. (The Second Nun’s Tale 383–
384) 
(Now Christ’s own beloved knights cast away all works of darkness). 
 
Evil nature 
The concept of ‘darkness’ associated with the human psyche can be noticed 
in the following contexts: 
 
(11) And thus they her sorowes for to slake 
Prayde her on their knees for goddis sake 
To come and rome her in company 
Awey to druyen her derk fantasie 
And finally she grauntid that request 
For well she saw it was for the best (The Franklin’s Tale 136) 
(And thus in order to assuage her sorrows they prayed for her on their 
knees for God’s sake to come accompany her to drive away her dark 
fantasy; and finally she granted that request for she saw it was for the 
best). 
 
(12) Ther the body of man, that whilom was foul and dark, 
Is moore cleer than the sonne. (The Man of Law’s Tale 382–383)  
(There was the body of a man that at some point was wicked and dark, 
is more clear than the Sun). 
 
(13) The derk ymagnynge of felonye, and al the compassynge (The Knight’s 
Tale 1137 ) 
(The dark image of felony, and all its dimensions). 
 
The analysis of the contexts shows no physical, literal image of ‘darkness’. 
Consequently, when referring to the human psyche, dark is a metaphorical 
element with no literal sense behind it. Dark was an abstract, epistemic and 
subjective element as it could evoke the features of evil and cruelty in contexts 
where the link with the literal ‘lack of light’ was cut off. At that point the notions 
of subjectivity and abstractness require some clarification. 
As for subjectivity, dark referring to ‘lack of light’ and dark applied to 
human psyche are, to some extent, subjective. Both ‘psychic darkness’ and 
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‘physical darkness’ can be viewed as a matter of human subjective perception. 
Consequently, both senses could be viewed as, to some extent, subjective.  
The notions of epistemicity and abstractness are used in the present paper 
with a view to showing that dark, when used with reference to human psyche or 
any other non-physical objects, is all about abstract values, such as evil or 
cruelty, while the notion of the ‘physical lack of light’ recedes into the 
background. Dark then becomes more abstract as it pertains to values and not to 
the physical lack of light. One could, however, argue that whenever the word 
dark is used to characterise the human psyche or any other non-physical object, 
it cannot denote the objects’ physical darkness as such objects are not physical 
objects. The interpretation of dark is then contingent on the object it is linked 
with. Physical objects rely on the concept of the ‘lack of light’, whereas the 
application of this concept to non-physical objects seems a negligible and 
unnecessary tool. From this perspective, different contexts accompanying dark 
require different interpretations. However, a different analysis of dark could also 
be drawn. This approach will show that different senses in dark are 
interconnected and that there is not such a sharp difference in the interpretation 
of dark modifying physical and non-physical objects. Before illustrating the 
approach, a few issues should be illustrated.  
As the data from the corpus indicate, dark was a polysemous adjective. 
Firstly, it could be a descriptive element of objects lacking light. Secondly, dark 
could also apply to objects devoid of light, but which additionally evoked the 
features of evil (e.g., Hell). In such contexts, dark was more than just a 
descriptive element. It referred to objects which were literally dark, but which 
were also imbued with values associated with a lack of light.’ Thirdly, dark 
could be associated with the attributes of evil rather than with any ‘physical lack 
of light’. These senses reflect the gradual increase in the level of abstractness. 
Dark could be conceived of as an element highlighting a lack of light or just a 
lack of positive values. Yet, a close correspondence between a more literal sense 
‘lack of light’ and a more abstract one ‘lack of positive values’ should be 
emphasised. The latter (a lack of positive values) could be the result of the 
metaphorical application of the former (a lack of light). Therefore, the notion of 
the ‘physical lack of light’ recedes into the background, yet it does not entirely 
disappear. The aspect of ‘a lack of light’ is not a literal element present in the 
interpretation of an expression, but an element salient on some abstract layer of 
conceptualisation needed to interpret dark in terms of negative values. Hence, 
the literal sense ‘a lack of light’ does not disappear once the context is changed, 
but acquires a new interpretation tightly linked with values. Consequently, 
different contexts do not require distinct and unconnected interpretations, but 
only slight modifications.  
Moreover, to put it metaphorically, ‘dark’ creates a binary opposition with 
‘light’. The concept of ‘light’ gives rise to the metaphor LIGHT IS 
GOODNESS, NOBLENESS, whereas ‘darkness’ creates the opposite, namely 
68 Agnieszka Wawrzyniak 
DARKNESS IS EVIL AND DEPRAVITY. The abstract and epistemic senses of 
dark are a subject to Tendency I (Traugott 1989), which states: 
Meaning based on the external described situation > meaning based on the 
internal situation. 
At this point, dark is an abstract, epistemic element, which evokes the 
association of evil, even if analysed out of context. According to Traugott, the 
notion of an ‘external described situation’ applies to the way a situation or an 
object is perceived by most people. People rely on their senses in describing the 
so called ‘external reality’. Consequently, if an object is perceived as black or 
dark, it cannot be referred to as yellow or red. We take it for granted that our 
sight is objective and thus it lets us view the world in which we live in a very 
similar way. Therefore, the description of external properties of objects is not 
based on evaluative judgements, but rather on the way things are accessible to 
our eyes. For cognitivists, sight is believed to be the most reliable of all human 
senses (Traugott 1989; Sweetser 1990, Krzeszowski 1997). In short, an external 
situation or reality is referred to as the reality that can be described in a roughly 
similar if not same way as it reflects the way things are accessible to human 
senses. The internal situation or reality, however, is associated with human 
subjective, evaluative judgement, and thus its perception varies among people. It 
is based on the way humans perceive reality and judge it rather than just 
physically see it. Such an approach, though it may seem simplified, is frequently 
adopted in order to show semantic changes occurring in a diachronic perspective 
in lexemes. Therefore, given the adjective dark, the sense standing for ‘lack of 
light’ is referred to as ‘external reality’ as it captures the description that would 
be shared by people. Contrariwise, dark applying to evil is viewed as the internal 
reality as it involves the individual, subjective approach which reflects one’s 
experiences shaping the perception of reality. As already mentioned, the 
approach advocated by Traugott may seem simplified once one approaches more 
philosophical views on objective and subjective reality. Accordingly, there is no 
such a thing as an ‘objective proposition’ because there is always an individual 
standing behind each proposition, hence it is always subjectively marked. 
Likewise, the notion of ‘a real world domain’ may also seem meaningless 
because we as humans do not have access to ‘the real world’. What is, in a 
simplified way called the real world, is the world AS IT IS PERCEIVED by 
people, which again entails the notions of subjectivity rather than objectivity or 
impartiality. Nevertheless, the present paper, whose aim is to deal with profiles 
of dark and blak, is more cognitivist than philosophical. Therefore, it adopts the 
approaches to internal/ external reality advocated by the above mentioned 
cognitivists. 
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Hard to understand, mysterious 
(14) Bet certayn menys as knowen clerkis  
Doth thingis that for certeyn ende ful derk is  
to mannys wit that for our ignoraunce (The Man of Law’s Tale 382–
384). 
(But certain men as clerks know; do things that at some point are 
obscure to man’s wit; due to our ignorance). 
 
Likewise, in this context ‘light’ and ‘darkness’ form binary oppositions. The 
concept of ‘light’ gives rise to the metaphor LIGHT IS WISDOM, whereas the 
concept of darkness instantiates the opposite, namely DARKNESS (or LACK 
OF LIGHT) IS OBSCURITY, IGNORANCE. ‘Darkness’ is here an abstract 
domain, which is cut off from the concrete sense. 
3. Analysis of blak 
Following The Etymological Dictionary of English Language (CEDEL, sv. 
blak), black originated from PGmc blakaz ‘burned’. In Old English blæc denoted 
‘dark’, whereas its cognates were ON blakkr ‘dark’, OHG blah ‘black’, Swed. 
black ‘ink’, and Du. blaken ‘to burn’. According to the Middle English 
Dictionary (MED, sv. blak), ME blak—PDE ‘black’ contained the following 
senses: 
 
1) of a black colour 
– it was applied in similes: black and blo ‘black and livid’, black or whit 
‘black or white’; of any colour or kind, black as col (blacche, crove, 
inde, mode, pich), blacker than pich 
– armed in black, clothed in black, bound in black 
– the colour of sin, sorrow, e.g., black berd—the Devil, black in his eye- 
‘he is guilty’ 
 
2) inclining to blackness, dark, discoloured 
– of eyes: dark, brown 
– of persons: swarthy, dark, brunette, black-haired 
– of colours: dark, deep 
 
3) without light 
– dark, gloomy, murky 
– fierce, terrible, wicked 
 
4) in compounds and combinations: 
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black frères ‘the Dominican friars’, black monk/none ‘a Benedictine 
monk/nun, black smith ‘a smith who works in iron’, black mondai 
‘Easter Monday’, black order ‘the Benedictines’, black rent ‘a type of 
blackmail’, black moneie ‘coins of cropper or brass’, black poding ‘a 
kind of pudding’, black sop ‘a dark colour of soup’, blak ston ‘a kind of a 
dark stone’, black sugar ‘brown sugar’, black berie ‘a black berry’, black 
brid ‘the English blackbird’, black mint ‘pepper mint’, black pepper 
‘black pepper’, black poppi ‘a variety of red poppy with black seeds’, 
black thorn ‘the shrub blackthorn’, black jaunes ‘jaundice with deep 
discolouration, black colre (galle) ‘black bile, the humour melancholy’. 
3.1 Literal senses of blak in The Canterbury Tales 
Blak related to the body 
 
Blak was, to a large extent, related to the body: 
 
(15) His nostrelis blak were and wyde (The General Prologue 559). 
(His nostrils were black and wide). 
(16) Black was his berd and manly was his face (The Knight’s Tale 1272). 
(His face was black and his face was manly). 
(17) His longe heris were kempt behynd his bak 
As ony rauen fethir it shoon for blak (The Knight’s Tale 1258–1286). 
(His long hair were combed behind his back; as any raven feather, it 
shone black). 
(18) His browis two were bent and blak as ony slo (The Miller’s Tale 59–
60). 
(His two eyebrows were bent and black as any plum). 
(19) Blake yen (The Knight’s Tale 925). 
(Black eyes). 
(20) A few frakelis in his face were spreynt 
Betwix yellow and somdeel blak meynt (The Knight’s Tale 1311–
1312). 
(A few freckles were scattered in his face; mingled between yellow 
and somewhat black). 
(21) And Saint Iherome sayde 
Whan he long tyme had dwelllid in desert 
(..) 
Where as he no mete but herbes and water to drynk  
Ne no bed but naked erthe.  
For whyche his flesh was blak as an Ethyope for hete and destroyde 
for colde (The Parson’s Tale 271). 
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(Where as he had no meat but herbs and water to drink; no bed but 
naked earth; because of which his flesh was black as an Ethiope due to 
heat and destroyed because of cold). 
 
The above contexts illustrate literal senses of blak (either black, dark or inclining 
to blackness) with no metaphorical undertones behind them. The data from the 
corpus show that blak was frequently linked with parts of the body (eyes, 
eyebrows, nostrils, beard, hair, freckles) or the whole body. In such contexts, it 
was used purely with reference to one’s appearance. The range of references 
blak could be linked with was wide. Moreover, the entities described as blak did 
not evoke negative associations, but rather neutral or even positive ones. 
Furthermore, in most contexts blak did not evoke the equivalent of PDE black, 
but was mostly a colour that could be classified as dark as it only approximated 
black. It was only in context (18) that blak corresponded to the PDE sense of 
black. Blak here was used in the simile in which the shade of blak was compared 
to a raven. In other contexts, ME blak was largely related to dark. In (19), blak is 
juxtaposed with a plum, thereby evoking the association of a dark purple colour. 
In (21), freckles are described as yellow and somehow blak. Consequently, blak 
was more of a mixture, containing even dark yellow in its framework. 
Additionally, blak could describe eyes, body or nostrils, a meaning which is 
closer to dark brown rather than black. As for hair, blak could correspond to 
PDE black, but also to dark. The context does not specify what colour was 
meant. In other words, the recorded contexts show that the range of shades 
embraced by blak was wide. ME blak could apply to a pure black approximating 
a coal, but also to brown or even to a dark shade mixed with yellow. 
Consequently, blak can be considered a macro-colour term for dark colours. 
Therefore, the application of blak with no modifying elements could evoke the 
idea of both dark or black. The similes often specified which particular shade of 
blak was intended.  
 
Blak related to clothes 
The literal sense of blak was also related to clothes, which can be 
exemplified by the following contexts: 
 
(22) A companye of ladies (…) 
Eche aftir other clothed blake 
But such a cry and such a woo they make 
That in worlde nys creature lyuynge 
That herde suche an other weymentynge (The Knight’s Tale 40–45). 
(A company of ladies; each after another clothed in black; but they 
made such a cry and such a weep; that in the world there is no living 
creature that heard such a lamentation). 
 
(23) In clothis blak dropped al with teris (The Knight’s Tale 2020). 
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(In black clothes all dripped with tears). 
 
(24) But in his blake clothis sorrowfully 
He cam at his comaundement an hye (The Knight’s Tale 2114–2115). 
(But in his black clothes full of sorrow; he followed his commandment 
from Heaven). 
 
(25) Ne wolde he that she were loue ne wyf 
But euer lyue in clothis blake 
Sool as the turtyl that hath lost his make (The Merchant’s Tale 834–
836). 
(He did not want her to be love nor wife; but that she ever should live 
in black clothes; alone as the turtle that lost his mate). 
 
The analysis shows that blak was also extensively used with reference to clothes. 
Black clothes were highly symbolic and evoked unbearable sadness and 
mourning. Blak was thus conceived of as a colour of sorrow. 
 
Other literal contexts of blackness 
 
Blak linked with a surrounding reality 
Other elements from the corpus described as blak can be exemplified by the 
following contexts: 
 
(26) The smyler with the knyf under the cloke 
The shepen brennyng with the blak smoke 
The treson of the murdryng in the bed 
The open werris with woundis alle bled (The Knight’s Tale 1141–
1144). 
(The murderer with the knife under the cloak; the shed burning with 
black smoke; the treason of murder in the bed, the open wars with 
wounds all bleeding). 
 
(27) This grisly rockis blake 
That sownen rather vnto foul confusion 
Of wreke than to ony maner creation (The Franklin’s Tale 160–162). 
(These awful black rocks; that seem rather a foul confusion of work 
rather than of any good creation). 
 
In these contexts, blak is a describing element of smoke (27) and rocks (28), 
hence objects of a surrounding reality. It approximates dark rather than PDE 
black. Moreover, in literary and figurative contexts blak could also be used to 
draw an atmosphere of evil, unpredictability and danger. Nevertheless, it should 
be emphasised that blak evoked only the associations of evil when it was put in 
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contexts evoking an atmosphere of evil. In other words, collocations such as 
blak smoke, or blak rock did not evoke the sense of evil when they were 
approached as isolated entities separated from a particular context. Used out of 
context, the expressions black smoke or black rocks were neutral and connected 
with the every-day, external reality, rather than evaluative, abstract senses 
pertaining to subjective judgments or attitudes.  
The juxtaposition of blak and dark reveals some striking differences 
between the two words. Both blak and dark could evoke a sense of evil and 
unpredictability bordering on danger. Nevertheless, in the case of blak, the sense 
of evil was just one of the associations of the colour rather than an abstract, 
epistemic sense. This connotation was tightly bound with the concept and visual 
image of a colour. Hence, rocks or smoke had to be literally black (or dark) in 
order to evoke the atmosphere of terror. Therefore, blak does not mark the 
completion of Traugott’s Tendency I, as the image of a colour is still imprinted 
in the conceptual framework of blak referring to evil or danger. The sense of 
evil, however, developed by dark was not one of the associations evoked by the 
literal sense, but an abstract, epistemic layer developed via a mapping of the 
concrete upon the abstract. The sense of evil could thus be considered one of the 
polysemous senses developed by dark. The expression dark fantasie evoked 
abstract, epistemic, evaluative senses even when approached out of context. 
Moreover, this expression was perceived as conventionalised and ordinary, with 
no metaphorical colouring behind it. Similarly, when applied to actions, or 
knowledge, dark was only an abstract term, cut off from its literal sense. 
 
Blak linked with devil  
ME blak was recorded in the collocation blak devil, where it evoked the 
concept of evil. In such contexts, blak is imbued with the concept of sin. 
Nevertheless, the concept of evil projected by blak is only partially abstract, as 
the link with the literal blackness is also preserved. In other words, blackness 
constitutes a literal meaning upon which metaphorical associations are projected. 
The devil was not conceived of in light colours, but as black or as dark. 
Therefore, the concept of a colour is not bleached from its framework. In other 
words, the new layer in blak is not an independent concept cut off from the 
colour term, but a new symbolic association entirely related with the colour. The 
idea of evil implied by blak can be seen in the following contexts: 
 
(28) I telle yow trouthe ye may trust me (…) 
Of arowes and of fyre with rede lemys 
Of grete bestes that wole hym byte(…) 
For feer of grete bolis and blake beris 
Or ellis blake deuylles wol hem take. (The Nun’s Prologue 107–116). 
(I will tell you the truth you can trust me (…) of arrows and of fire 
with red limbs of great beasts that will bite him(..). For fear of great 
bulls and black bears or else black devils that will take him). 
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It should be emphasised that blak evoked an association with evil, but not 
because this lexeme was abstract enough, but because it was juxtaposed with the 
devil, which was viewed as an embodiment of evil. The devil was literally 
visualised and portrayed as blak. Moreover, it also evoked the connotations of 
evil and cruelty. The juxtaposition of blak and evil in the mind of the 
conceptualiser might have led to the gradual association of blak with evil. In a 
similar way, bears were viewed as black and, thus evil. Consequently, in such 
contexts blak was not a neutral colour term, but a descriptive element marked by 
evil. In other words, the connection of blak with evil could be a consequence of 
an identification and perception of the devil in black colours, and a subsequent 
transfer of values linked with devil upon the element modifying it. 
Consequently, from a purely descriptive element, blak develops a more abstract 
layer and becomes more than just a descriptive element related to the appearance 
of a devil. Yet, blak is not an evaluative, epistemic sense, as the concept of a 
colour is central in its conceptual framework. 
The juxtaposition of blak and dark in religious contexts also reveals some 
differences. As has already been mentioned, dark was a part of circuitous 
phrases referring to Hell, namely dark earth, or dark place, which originally 
were associated with Hell due to the scarcity of light. It should be emphasised 
that dark is not linked with the lexeme Hell directly. Blak, however, collocates 
with the devil and not with any other creature that could only stand for or 
symbolise the devil. Dark then allowed for a variety of understatements unlike 
blak, which was more concrete, and thereby needed a proper context and clearly 
identified entities.  
4. Conclusions 
To conclude, the paper aimed to show the existing differences between blak and 
dark in The Canterbury Tales on both the literal and metaphorical planes.  
On the literal plane, dark could be paraphrased as ‘deficient in light’. The 
concept of a colour played a secondary role in its conceptual framework. It was 
merely a colour that resulted from a lack of light. Moreover, the range of entities 
dark was linked with was rather limited. The lexeme was mostly used with 
reference to places and weather, and thus entities that could be characterised by 
a small amount of light. Additionally, dark functioned as a euphemism for Hell, 
which was considered a taboo. It constituted a part of conventional phrases used 
automatically to avoid direct references to Hell. 
On the metaphorical plane, dark could refer to evil, as well as to obscurity 
or ignorance. In these applications, dark was an autonomous, subjective element 
with no literal sense behind it, thereby marking Traugott’s Tendency I (1989): 
Meaning based on the external described situation > meaning based on the 
internal situation 
The semantic flexibility of dark measured by means of the variety of its 
metaphorical senses could be explained on the grounds of the literal sense of 
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dark, namely the ‘lack of light’. In other words, the literal sense ‘lack of light’ 
was conducive to the further emergence of metaphorical senses, as the concept 
of ‘darkness’ and of ‘light’ could complement each other. ‘Dark’ and ‘light’ 
formed binary oppositions, giving rise to similar abstract values in spite of being 
on opposite poles.  
The analysis of blak has shown that it did not evoke the equivalent of PDE 
black, but was primarily a colour term, which could stand for black, dark, 
brown, or even a dark shade mixed with yellow. The similes often specified 
which particular shade was intended. Nevertheless, although broad and including 
different shades, the idea of a colour was central in the conceptual framework of 
blak. The lexeme was used mostly with reference to body parts, where it evoked 
neutral or positive associations, as well as to clothes, where it possessed the 
attribute of unbearable sadness and mourning.  
Furthermore, blak could also be used to evoke an atmosphere of evil, 
unpredictability and danger when it modified every-day objects. Yet, unlike 
dark, these senses did not mark the completion of Traugott’s Tendency I, as the 
sense of evil was just one of the symbolic associations of the colour, rather than 
an abstract, epistemic sense. Consequently, contrary to dark, blak in The 
Canterbury Tales did not develop abstract, evaluative senses that could be 
projected via a mapping of the concrete on a more abstract layer of 
conceptualisation. 
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Gender Assignment of Anglicisms in French 
Tibor Őrsi 
Modern English does not distinguish the grammatical gender of 
nouns. The French language has two grammatical genders: 
masculine and feminine. What happens to Anglicisms that enter 
French? In the process of borrowing, the so-called “masculine 
tendency” seems to operate: Most Anglicisms including meeting, 
remake and show are assigned to the masculine gender. Anglicisms 
denoting women become feminine: call-girl, suffragette. Words 
containing suffixes that are feminine in French (efficience, 
inflation) as well as certain words that can be associated with 
feminine referents also take the feminine gender. Pomme ‘apple’ is 
feminine in French. This explains why golden and granny, which 
refer to species of apple, become feminine in French. We come 
across inconsistencies and hesitations in daily usage. We also take a 
short look at gender assignment of Anglicisms in Modern 
Norwegian. 
1. Introduction 
Most languages of the world distinguish the category of grammatical gender. 
Genders divide nouns into formally and semantically motivated groups. The 
number of classes depends on the criteria that serve as the basis of classification. 
In certain exotic languages, general semantic categories like plant, animal, 
edible, etc. may constitute genders, as in Mandarin Chinese. 
2. The role of grammatical gender 
It constitutes the basis of pronominal reference. In French, for example, homme 
‘man’ is masculine (= m.), which corresponds to its natural gender, that is why it 
can be replaced by the masculine personal pronoun il ‘he’. Femme ‘woman’ is 
feminine (= f.) and can be referred to by the feminine personal pronoun elle 
‘she’. 
Grammatical gender governs adjectival, pronominal and sometimes even 
verbal agreement. In the French phrase cette table ronde ‘this round table’, the 
noun table is feminine, which is why the attributive adjective rond ‘round’ takes 
the feminine form ronde. The demonstrative adjective, which usually occurs in 
78 Tibor Őrsi 
post-nominal position in French, also becomes feminine (cette), in contrast with 
the masculine forms ce, cet. 
By far the most important function of grammatical gender, however, is to 
assign nouns into various declension types. For example, in Latin, mare ‘sea’ 
was neutral. In Old English, the gender of nouns was grammatical, not natural or 
biological. The Old English words for both ‘woman’ (wif) and ‘child’ (cild) were 
neuter. Old English wifmann, also meaning ‘woman’, was masculine, and 
hlæfdige ‘lady’ was feminine. Hunta ‘huntsman’ was masculine, tid ‘time; hour’ 
was feminine and treow ‘tree’ was neutral. 
3. Markedness 
When languages are described, the morphologically simpler and more frequent 
form is treated as the base form within a category. The other forms are given 
with reference to the base form. Generally, the singular is considered as 
unmarked, and the plural is the marked form. In the French gender system, 
masculine is the unmarked form. The feminine form is considered as the 
morphological variety of the masculine: le prince ‘the prince’ // la princesse ‘the 
princess’. The unmarked masculine form takes the suffix –esse to form the 
marked feminine form princesse. 
4. Is the assignment of grammatical gender predictable? 
In Language (1933:280), Bloomfield claims: “There seems to be no practical 
criterion by which the gender of a noun in German, French, or Latin could be 
determined.” By contrast, Tucker et al. (1977) quoted in Corbett (1991:57–61) 
prove that gender assignment is coherent in French. There are more exceptions 
than in other languages, but the rules form a clear system. The major rules are 
phonological. It does not suffice to focus only on the last phoneme of a 
particular word; in some cases we must also take into account the penultimate 
and the antepenultimate phonemes. If we do so, the grammatical gender of any 
French noun can be predicted with a hundred per cent accuracy. 
5. The change of grammatical gender within the history of a language 
The grammatical gender of certain words may change within the history of a 
particular language. In Classical Latin, flos, florem ‘flower’ was masculine. In 
French, fleur is feminine. Also in Classical Latin, arbor ‘tree’ was feminine, 
perhaps because trees were associated with the ideas of maternity and fertility. 
Already in Old French and similarly in Modern French, arbre is assigned to the 
masculine class. In the 16
th
 century, owing to the growing familiarity with 
Classical Latin, the original masculine gender was also used. This type of 
hesitation, which only comes to an end in the 17
th
 century, can be observed in 
the case of other “transgender” nouns as well. Modern French art (m.) ‘art’, 
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from Latin ars (f.) is frequently feminine. In the 16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries, words of 
learned origin like épithète ‘epithet’ and horreur ‘horror’ are used either as 
masculine or feminine, but both will take the feminine gender afterwards. The 
deverbal noun échange ‘exchange’ alternates between masculine and feminine, 
but is finally fixed as masculine in gender. 
6. The change of grammatical gender in the process of borrowing 
Borrowing often leads to the change of the gender of the borrowed items. 
According to Hock (1991:401), “gender assignment seems to operate in terms of 
the following parameters: 
1. Formal criteria; 
2. general semantic criteria; 
3. considerations of the gender of semantically related native words; 
4. a ‘default class’ to which words are assigned if none of the other criteria 
provides a solution.” 
Latin fenestra ‘window’ developed into French fenêtre. The feminine gender of 
the Modern French word corresponds to that of the Latin etymon. But why is 
Modern German Fenster ‘window’ neuter? It can be traced back to the same 
Latin word. Among other words, Old Norse used the compound word vindauga 
to refer to ‘window’. For the sake of gaining a better understanding, I 
“modernize” the form of the Old Norse word into what it would be in its Modern 
German form: *Windauge. It is an endocentric compound: der Wind ‘wind’ + 
das Auge ‘eye’. Since the morphological head of the compound word is neuter, 
the whole compound takes the neuter gender: *das Windauge. In the meantime, 
the borrowed word Fenster ousted the *windauga form in German, the latter, 
however, continued to serve as a semantic model and determined the neuter 
gender of Fenster. English window reflects the same compound; over time its 
second element has become opaque. 
7. Grammatical gender in the history of Indo-European languages 
Grammatical gender is a major category of the Indo-European languages. 
Linguistic change affected these languages differently. Old English distinguished 
the three grammatical genders of nouns, adjectives and pronouns. By the end of 
the Middle English period (15
th
 century), the noun abandoned the category of 
grammatical gender in favour of natural gender. In Modern English, grammatical 
distinctions of gender are mainly confined to the third-person singular (personal, 
reflexive and relative) pronouns. 
Following the collapse of the Latin three-gender system, in Romance 
languages such as French, nouns fall into two gender classes: masculine and 
feminine. Anglicisms that enter other languages appear to conform to the rules 
of the borrowing languages. To what grammatical gender are Anglicisms 
allotted in French? The rest of the present paper focuses on this issue. 
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8. The proportion of feminine Anglicisms in the history of the French 
language 
Data supplied by Nymannson (1995:96) indicate that the percentage of feminine 
Anglicisms is gradually decreasing in French. They represented 24.7% of all the 
Anglicisms borrowed in the 17
th
 century, 16.1% in the 18
th
 century, 14.6% in the 
19
th
 century and, finally, they amounted to only 12.7% in the 20
th
 century. These 
data clearly show that words borrowed from English tend to be assigned to the 
masculine class. The masculine tendency can be explained by the neutralization 
of the differences of the grammatical genders. Anglicisms were automatically 
interpreted as masculine in French. As a result, their grammatical gender can, to 
a large extent, be predicted: le jazz, le jogging, un drink, un thriller, un avatar. 
Certain Anglicisms that refer to persons can be used both as masculine and 
feminine words: coach, fan, free-lance, skinhead, snob, teenager. 
9. Factors influencing the feminization of Anglicisms 
9.1. Natural gender is preferred for persons. 
Anglicisms that refer to women usually take the feminine gender: la barmaid, la 
business–woman, la call-girl, la first lady, la girl-friend, la girl-scout, la 
majorette, la rock queen, la suffragette, la vamp, la working woman. 
9.2. Inanimate referents take the gender of an existing French word. 
Inanimate referents are usually allocated to the unmarked, that is, the masculine 
gender unless some special factor prevails: le copyright, le derby, le folklore. 
Such a factor can be what Humbley (1974:67) refers to as attraction 
homonymique: An Anglicism may take the gender of a French word that has 
similar form and etymology. English check-list becomes feminine as an 
Anglicism in French since liste ‘list’ is feminine. Dose, the morphological head 
of English overdose, is identical in form and meaning with the French word 
dose. The Anglicism overdose as well as its variety surdose, partially nativized 
by means of a French prefix, are both feminine. The feminine gender of 
science-fiction agrees with that of the French word fiction ‘(work of) fiction’. 
9.3. Semantic analogy in general 
Certain Anglicisms may become feminine if they can be associated with a 
feminine word in French. Les sixties ‘the sixties’ is feminine, since année ‘year’ 
is feminine in French. French dictionaries uniformly classify the Anglicism 
country music as a feminine word, since its morphological head music 
corresponds to the French feminine word musique. However, if country is used 
elliptically to refer to the whole phrase, it can be both masculine and feminine. 
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Golden, granny (smith) and starking denote various species of apple. They 
become feminine on the analogy of the French feminine word pomme ‘apple’. 
The French word bière ‘beer’ is feminine. This may explain that ale and lager 
take the feminine gender. 
9.4. Semantic analogy in the case of compounds 
Compounds of English origin may take the gender of the obvious French 
equivalent of the last element of the Anglicism. The second element of the 
Anglicisms cover-story and detective story corresponds to the feminine word 
histoire in French, which is why the Anglicism is attributed to the feminine class. 
In spite of the fact that French speakers are aware of the foreignness of these 
expressions, there is a constraint to assign grammatical gender to them and 
integrate them into the system of the French language. Fashion victim (1995) is a 
fairly recent Anglicism in French. Victime, the corresponding French word with a 
slightly different spelling, accounts for the feminine gender of the Anglicism. 
9.5. Semantic analogy in the case of shortened forms 
Accepted shortenings may preserve the feminine gender, since they are used side 
by side with the full forms: la sitcom < situational comedy “comédie” (f.), la 
rave < rave party, rave music “partie” (f.), “musique” (f.). 
9.6. Semantic and phonological analogy  
Nymansson (1995:105) supposes that house ['aus] < house music ['ausmjuzik] is 
feminine, possibly because for French speakers unfamiliar with English, the 
phonetic form of house and épouse [uz] may appear similar. This preserves the 
feminine gender. In French, the majority of words ending in the phoneme [v] 
belong to the feminine gender. The pronunciation of rave resembles that of 
relève. Nymansson is of the opinion that rave will remain feminine. 
9.7. Analogy motivated by suffixes 
Owing to the particularities of the development of the English and French 
languages, a considerable number of words of the two languages are identical. 
Anglicisms may belong to this group as well. Suffixes spelt identically but 
pronounced differently obviously correspond to each other. In French, certain 
suffixes are always feminine: –ence/–ance, –ion/–tion, –ette. Whenever the 
English word ends in a suffix that is feminine in French, the Anglicism will 
become feminine. The grammatical feminization of French performance is 
motivated by the analogy of French words like alliance, correspondance and 
renaissance. Efficience, modelled on English efficiency, a term used in 
economics, is feminine, since confidence, exigence, patience, science, etc. are 
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feminine in French. Some Anglicisms contain the French diminutive suffix –
ette, which refers to the feminine form. It goes without saying that disquette and 
kitchenette are attributed to the feminine gender. 
10. Gender assignment in Norwegian 
The following overview relies heavily on Graedler (2002). Historically, 
Norwegian has a three-gender system, with masculine, feminine and neuter 
genders. This is reflected in most of the traditional dialects and in the Nynorsk 
variety, whereas in the Bokmål variety, masculine and feminine are regarded as 
one common gender. The neuter gender is treated separately. From the point of 
view of gender assignment, the interesting question is when Anglicisms become 
neuter, in contrast to the common gender. In Bokmål, the unmarked form is the 
masculine, and between eighty and ninety per cent of the borrowed nouns are 
assigned to this class. Gender assignment seems to be based mainly on semantic 
principles; for instance, animacy almost invariably results in masculine gender in 
new words: call girl, he-man, bitch, pitbull. 
Formal features also have an impact on gender assignment. In case of 
conflict, semantic features seem to overrule the formal ones. 
1. Monosyllabic words tend to become neuter: kick, scoop, but look (m.). 
2. Endings: 
2.a. Some derivational endings are identical (–er, –ing) or similar (–sjon, 
–tion) in English and in Norwegian. Here analogy seems to be quite strong. 
Words with these endings take common gender: farmer, doping, audition. 
2.b. Words ending in –ment are neuter in Norwegian. And that is also the 
gender favoured by most English loans: understatement (n.), gentlemen’s 
agreement (n.) as well as loans from French: appartement (n.)  
Anglicisms with inanimate referents may take the same gender as the native 
equivalent: race is neuter on the analogy of Norwegian løp (n.) ‘race, running 
event’. Sometimes the source of analogy is purely speculative: cover (n.) is neuter, 
perhaps on the analogy of omslag ‘cover’. Mappe (m.) could also have served as 
the source of the analogy. In that case, Norwegian cover ought to be masculine. 
11. Summary 
The majority of the Anglicisms that enter French are assigned to the masculine 
gender. The number of feminine Anglicisms is gradually decreasing. Gender 
assignment varies in some cases: sex-shop, trade-union. Sometimes dictionaries 
provide contradictory information. In most cases, semantic factors motivate 
gender assignment, but in a number of cases we come across inconsistencies. 
Morpho-phonological factors influence gender assignment when Anglicisms end 
in certain suffixes. There seems to be no perfect hierarchy between the 
aforementioned criteria. The Anglicism holding tends to be masculine, similarly 
to other Anglicisms ending in –ing. Since it is a shortened form of holding 
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company, it can be interpreted as ‘company’, that is ‘société, forme, maison’, 
which are all feminine. This possible interpretation accounts for the occasional 
allocation to the feminine gender. 
We also investigated gender assignment in Norwegian. We found that it 
functioned along remarkably similar lines. 
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